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Abstract
A methodology for nonmarket goods is presented based on preference algebra and
set theory that allows us to specify exactly when preference assumptions such as weak
complementarity can be tested against revealed preference information. Revealed pref-
erence is insuﬃcient for welfare analysis involving state preference variables such as
nonmarket goods. The preference and set-theoretic structure presented here is specif-
ically designed to characterize the minimal additional preference information neces-
sary for exact welfare analysis, and also provides a common basis for specifying the
many context-speciﬁc methods that have been proposed for closing the information
gap (whether or not they provide this minimal information). The paper closes with
examples demonstrating how this structure can be used as a methodology for working
with assumptions about preference structure, focusing on when such assumptions can
be tested against revealed preference. This includes an extended examination of weak
complementarity and related issues, followed by ﬁve shorter examples including two
types of repackaging for price indices and the new and disappearing goods problem.
Keywords: Identifying preference, Preference-theoretic, Methodology, Nonmarket goods,
Testing preference restrictions, Weak complementarity, Existence value, Weak substi-
tutability, Repackaging price index, Cross-product repackaging, New and disappearing
goods.
iWelfare analysis involving a nonmarket good, such as environmental quality, requires
knowledge of the consumer’s preference over distinctions where the consumer is not able
to choose. For example, the individual consumer is not given a choice in the marketplace
between clean and dirty air.1 This is also true for some contexts that are not traditionally
understood as nonmarket goods. I therefore use the term “state preference variable” deﬁned
as a nontrivial argument in the consumer’s preference relation over which she has no economic
control. The consumer may care about the state preference variable itself and also the
variable may aﬀect her commodity preferences. In addition to environmental variables such
as global warming, examples of state preference variables include the existence and quality of
public goods, the quality of some market goods such as monopoly goods, and perhaps even
aspects of Behavioral Economics where for instance a person may prefer to be not clinically
depressed (or not a drug addict), but is not able to obtain this state without the development
of a drug or a government program providing the drug to the indigent.
Any welfare analysis concerned with variance or changes in state preference variable
values requires knowledge of the consumer’s joint preference over that variable and com-
modities. While this may only require very local knowledge such as to verify the eﬃciency
of a solution’s ﬁrst order conditions, more extensive knowledge is required for more typical
applications involving larger discrete changes in the state preference variables, such as with
measures like Equivalent Variation. With any of these applications we have a problem: pref-
erence information can be recovered from the observable demand function only to the extent
that is does not involve any distinctions in a state preference variable. We can thus only
partially identify the joint preference over these variables and commodities.
In this paper I develop a general structure based on preference logic and basic set theory
that enables us to characterize the missing preference information that is needed to fully
specify the overall joint preference relation (when combined with the available revealed pref-
erence information). The structure allows us to precisely describe the minimal amount of
missing information, but is also robust enough so that we deal with potential approaches for
ﬁlling in this preference information gap that provide more than enough information.
Many context-speciﬁc methods have been proposed to supply the missing preference in-
formation, especially for settings involving product quality and environmental issues. These
applications typically include assumptions or qualitative information that allow us to at least
partially close the information gap. Each such application is thus deﬁned by the additional
preference information (API) it provides. What I might call an instance of “additional pref-
erence information” is typically referred to in the literature more narrowly as a “preference
(or utility) restriction” or perhaps as a “maintained hypothesis.”2 This restrictive terminol-
ogy emphasizes the assumptive nature of the additional information, while my more general
terminology is explicitly open to the possibility of using real preference information.
The immediate application of the structure developed here is that we can state exactly
when preference assumptions such as weak complementarity are suﬃcient and also when
1I realize that there may be plausible exceptions to this statement. However, please accept it in the spirit
that it is provided, for the purpose of illustrating the nonmarket good concept.
2Such as in Smith and Banzhaf (2004) and Ebert (2001), respectively.
1they can be tested against revealed preference. The structure can be used to determine
whether any given API only partially ﬁlls the information gap, exactly ﬁlls the gap, or in-
cludes more than enough information. When an API includes excess preference information
we can always test it against the demand function in the form of revealed preference in-
formation. In addition to one-way tests of speciﬁc individual preference restrictions such as
weak complementarity, we can also sometimes obtain two-ways tests for the validity of whole
classes of API’s. Examples of using this structure for testing and other analysis with speciﬁc
API’s and classes of API’s are provided in this paper after the structure is developed. Other
potential applications of this structure are discussed in the conclusion.
The theoretical literature concerned with welfare analysis in the context of state prefer-
ence variables such as nonmarket goods and product quality is dominated by applications of
real analysis, and hence requires continuous state preference variables and other regularity
conditions to enable various techniques from calculus. My major departure from this liter-
ature is that I instead rely on the algebraic properties of preference, such as transitivity, in
combination with basic set theory. This has two advantages. The ﬁrst is the obvious one,
the results are more general as no restrictions are imposed on the state preference variables –
they do not even need to be numbers. The second is that by stepping away from the calculus
paradigm, and hence from the quasi-traditional microeconomic constructions that are the
workhorse in this literature, we can obtain results that are not available with a methodology
that is so narrowly focused on real analysis.3 Combining these two approaches (preference
algebra and real analysis) should be quite powerful but is beyond the scope of this paper.
The rest of this paper is organized into ﬁve sections. The modelling setup presented in
the ﬁrst allows me to specify the nature of the missing information problem in the second
section. Then with the third, I develop the just discussed preference-theoretic structure.
Weak complementarity is examined in the fourth section along with several other examples
of how this general structure may be applied, followed by a conclusions section. All proofs
are deferred to the Appendix.4
1 Modelling Setup
Given the wide range of potential application areas, modelling assumptions are kept to a
minimum so as to keep the results as general as possible, while at the same time maintaining
tractability by remaining close to our standard understanding of preference and demand.
However, this paper only deals with the preference and demand of an individual consumer,
so that any direct application of this work in the context of market demand would require
the usual simple “representative consumer” assumption.
3For example, we are able to ﬁnd that exact welfare analysis is possible in conditions where it is deemed
impossible in that literature. See Note 61.
4Editorial note: All theorems are presented with the intention of either demonstrating the nature of the
problem, developing the preference-theoretic structure, or illustrating its application. Presenting proofs in
the main text would detract from that purpose. Furthermore, for the most part the proofs consist of multiple
applications of simple preference logic and set theory which many readers would ﬁnd rather tedious.
2State preference variables, which may be a scalers, vectors or non-numbers, and may
be discrete or continuous, are represented by lower case z. Upper case Z represents the
set of admissible values of the state preference variable, such as Z = {Global Warming,
Not Global Warming}. Superscripts are used to distinguish individual elements of Z, such as
in za,zb ∈ Z.5 We shall assume that Z is non-trivial in that it has at least two elements. Let
X be the commodity consumption set (typically X = ℜL
+). The consumer has a preference
relation over Y = X × Z represented by %Y , and given prices, wealth and z, she chooses
x ∈ X to achieve the highest aﬀordable preference level,
b x(p,z,w) = {x ∈ X |p   x ≤ w, and (x,z) %Y (¯ x,z) for all ¯ x such that p   ¯ x ≤ w}, (1)
with prices p ∈ P = ℜL
++ and wealth w ∈ W = ℜ++ strictly positive. Demand is thus
deﬁned as an extended function of prices, state preference variables and wealth. The basic
preference and choice assumptions are that the unobservable preference relation is rational
on Y , as well as continuous and locally nonsatiated for any distinctions in X,6 and that the
observable demand function is single valued.7 The distinction introduced here between the
choice domain X with typical element x, and the preference domain Y with typical element
(x,z), is the root source of the problem addressed in this paper.
For purposes of welfare analysis we are only concerned with elements of Y that might
actually occur with market interaction, i.e., those can be obtained with the demand function.
For each z ∈ Z, the obtainable set in X is {x ∈ X |x = b x(p,z,w) for some (p,w) ∈ ℜ
L+1
++ }.8
To ease the presentation in this paper I assume that the obtainable set is the same for all
z ∈ Z, denoted by b X.9 With b X, the overall obtainable subset of Y is deﬁned as b Y = b X ×Z.
The sets b X and b Y are known to the analyst if demand is fully observable. The notation %b Y
indicates the restriction of %Y to the obtainable preference domain b Y . Thus, for purposes
of welfare analysis we are only interested in the preference information represented by %b Y .
For each z ∈ Z, we can use %b Y to deﬁne a z-ﬁxed preference relation on b X, %z, such that
x1 %z x2 ⇐⇒ (x1,z) %b Y (x2,z) for all x1,x2 ∈ b X. It then follows that each %z is rational,
continuous and locally nonsatiated. I assume that each %z can be uniquely identiﬁed from the
demand function.10 This key assumption should be noncontroversial as it is a more careful
5Reserving subscripts for individual components in a z vector.
6Continuity on the Z portion of Y is a vacuous property for any discrete z and therefore meaningless
without special restrictions on the nature of Z. Local nonsatiation is only useful if restricted to the choice
set X, even if meaningful on the larger preference set.
7The preference relation is not necessarily monotone or convex. While strict convexity of preference is
suﬃcient for the demand relationship to be single valued, even weak convexity is not necessary. If preference
is monotone, then weak convexity is necessary, and strict convexity becomes necessary when preference is
strongly monotone.
8This distinction between X and the obtainable subset is also used by Richter (1971). There is no “usual”
obtainable set. For example with X = ℜ2
+, three diﬀerent obtainable consumption sets are obtained with
Cobb-Douglas, quasilinear and Stone-Geary preferences.
9However all of the results presented here except for Theorem A3 have been obtained for the more general
case without this assumption.
10More formally, suppose that the same demand function was obtained with two preference relations on Y ,
3statement of the widely understood idea that there is a one-to-one relationship between
ordinary preference relations and ordinary demand functions (both without state preference
variables).11 Working in the other direction, we can construct the extended demand function
with only {%z |z ∈ Z}:
b x(p,z,w) = {x ∈ b X |p   x ≤ w, and x %z ¯ x for all ¯ x ∈ b X such that p   ¯ x ≤ w}. (2)
Thus the information content of the demand function is identical with the set {%z |z ∈ Z}.12
I shall refer to this information as revealed preference information, or more formally, as the
identiﬁable z-ﬁxed preference relations {%z |z ∈ Z}.
2 Problem: Missing Preference Information
The previous paragraph sets up our missing preference information problem: since the de-
mand function can be constructed with only {%z |z ∈ Z}, any other preference distinctions
speciﬁed by %b Y cannot recovered from demand. Thus for any (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ b Y with
za  = zb, we cannot determine whether or not (xa,za) %b Y (xb,zb). This should not be
surprising. Since the consumer never faces a choice between (xa,za) and (xb,zb), it is not
possible for this preference information to be reﬂected in consumer behavior and hence can-
not be incorporated into the demand function – there can be no revealed preference that
involve distinctions in z.
The missing preference information problem is illustrated by Figure 1, for some za,zb ∈ Z
with za  = zb, X = ℜ2
+ and b X = ℜ2
++. With ﬁxed z = za, from the demand function
b x(p,z,w), we can identify the preference relation %za as represented in part (a) by the
indiﬀerence curves Ia
j . Similarly, with z = zb we can identify %zb as represented by the
indiﬀerence curves Ib
j in part (b). Then we know for example that all the points in Ia
5 are
preferred to the points in Ia
3 and all the points in Ib
4 are preferred over the elements of Ib
1.
However from revealed preference alone, we do not know whether or not the consumer prefers
the points of Ia
5 (with z = za) over those of Ib
3 (with z = zb). The problem is then recovering
the remaining preference information that will enable us to compare the indiﬀerence curves
in part (a) with those in part (b).
The information content of %b Y not available with {%z |z ∈ Z} is necessary for ex-
act welfare analysis involving distinctions in z. Furthermore, the whole of %b Y is suﬃcient
%A and %B (each replacing %Y in equation (1)). Then for each z ∈ Z, I am assuming (x1,z) %A (x2,z) ⇐⇒
(x1,z) %B (x2,z) for all x1,x2 ∈ b X.
11Proofs for this typically require additional conditions such as that the demand function satisﬁes the
Lipschitz condition (Uzawa, 1971). Thus with this assumption I am implicitly assuming whatever regularity
conditions are required to make it true in given a situation. It is only here, in the traditional context of X,
that I tacitly take advantage of real analysis. I dispense with it in the context of Z.
12This implies an interpretation of the demand function such that it includes only quantitative information,
with no qualitative information (such as about how the products are used and thereby provide utility, or
descriptive information about the similarity or dissimilarity of diﬀerent products). Product names are
considered only nominal and by themselves provide no substantive information.
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Figure 1: Preference indiﬀerence curves in X = ℜ2
+ with alternative z values.
for such analysis. The most basic welfare question in this context would ask which of some
(xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ b Y is “better” or preferred. As already discussed, this can be answered with
%b Y , but not if za  = zb and we only know {%z |z ∈ Z}. The state preference variable theoret-
ical literature is predominantly concerned with specifying exact wealth-compensation-type
welfare measures or price index constructs. Suppose that we are concerned with a change
in price and z from (pa,za) to (pb,zb) with wealth ﬁxed at w0. Then the equivalent com-
pensating wealth may be measured by EV where xa = b x(pa,za,w0 +EV ), xb = b x(pb,zb,w0)
and (xa,za) ∼b Y (xb,zb).13 From this we can also obtain a price index, ϕ = (w0 + EV )/w0.
Thus %b Y is suﬃcient for exact welfare analysis while {%z |z ∈ Z} by itself is insuﬃcient.
Moreover, all of the preference information present in %b Y is necessary if we need to be in
a position to consider any pair (pa,za),(pb,zb) ∈ P × Z. Since %b Y is suﬃcient without
additional assumptions, it follows that continuity and other regularity conditions typically
imposed on z are not necessary for exact welfare analysis, however useful they may be.
Given our inability to identify the “true” preference relation %b Y , we will often want to
deal with the set of feasible candidate preference relations that could be the “true” relation.
This set can be characterized with a key demand-consistency concept,
Deﬁnition. Given an extended demand function b x(p,z,w), with all of the z-ﬁxed relations
identiﬁable from b x, {%z |z ∈ Z}, a preference relation % deﬁned on some e Y ⊆ Y is said to
be b x-consistent if it is consistent with each %z, z ∈ Z.
13EV is an equivalent variation welfare measure; a compensating variation measure is also easily con-
structed. The property “uniﬁed preference” to be introduced later is a suﬃcient but not a necessary condition
for the existence of xa and hence also for EV .
5Thus % is b x-consistent if and only if (xa,z) % (xb,z) ⇔ xa %z xb for all (xa,z),(xb,z) ∈
e Y
T b Y . With e Y = b Y , any b x-consistent relation could be the true relation. Hence the set
of feasible candidate preference relations is Φ(b x) = {% deﬁned on b Y | % is b x-consistent}.
Since the unknown “true” preference relation %b Y is an element, we know that Φ(b x) is not
empty. With only revealed preference information we are able exclude any preference relation
on b Y that is not an member of Φ(b x), but are not able exclude any element of Φ(b x).
To help motivate the rest of this paper, the remainder of this section focuses on the
breadth of Φ(b x) membership. Most of the concepts in this article are more easily devel-
oped and presented purely in terms of preference relations. However representative utility
functions can be used to provide a characterization of Φ(b x) that the reader may ﬁnd more
meaningful. I assume that all utility functions have the same range ℜu ⊆ ℜ,14 and that
%Y can be represented by a utility function, uY : Y → ℜu with notation uY(x,z). The
constrained utility maximization program is then,
Program UY: max
x
uY (x,z)
s.t. p   x ≤ w,
x ∈ X.
We thus obtain the same extended demand function as with Equation (1), b x(p,z,w).
We can precisely characterize the membership of Φ(b x) in terms of utility functions that
are related by a special class of transformations:
Theorem 1. Let u1 and u2 be two utility functions representing preferences on Y .
a. The utility functions u1 and u2 will yield the same demand function with Program UY
if and only if there is some transformation g : ℜu × Z → ℜ, g(u,z), such that u2(x,z) =
g (u1(x,z),z) for all (x,z) ∈ b Y , with g strictly increasing in u. Such a transformation is
called a “g-transform.”15
b. u1 and u2 represent the same preference relation on b Y if and only if the g-transform of part
(a) is actually a traditional monotonic transformation f : ℜu → ℜ such that g(u,z) = f(u)
for all (u,z) ∈ b ℜ1 × Z, where b ℜ1 is the range of u1 when restricted to the domain b Y ,
b ℜ1 = {u ∈ ℜu |u = u1(x,z) for some (x,z) ∈ b Y }.
If both u1 and u2 are also diﬀerentiable in x and related by a g-transform as described in
part (a), then their respective Kuhn-Tucker Conditions associated with Program UY will
be equivalent. If u1 and u2 represent the same preference order and if the g-transform is
diﬀerentiable with respect to z, then part (b) implies that ∂g/∂z ≡ 0.
From Theorem 1 we know that %i∈ Φ(b x) if and only if there is a g-transform such that
ui(x,z) = g (uY(x,z),z), where ui represents an extension of %i to Y .16 With the wide
14This simplifying assumption only reduces the available utility representations for any given preference
relation, and thereby enables the “if and only if” statements in Theorem 1. Typically, ℜu = [0,∞).
15The (⇐) aspect of part a of this theorem has also been identiﬁed by Ebert (2001).
16Assuming that %i is representable by a utility function. Henceforth I will gloss over the distinction
between an %∈ Φ(b x) and an extension of % that may be represented by a utility function deﬁned on Y .
6variety of potential g-transforms, we can see how welfare analysis for diﬀerences in a state
preference variable is impossible using only the preference information available from the
demand function. For example, the maximal range of our previously deﬁned welfare measure
EV is (−w0,∞), and as a consequence of Theorem 1, every EV value in this maximal range
will be taken on by some element of Φ(b x).17 The same is true for other traditional exact
welfare measures such as compensating variation and assorted price indices with respect to
their maximal ranges. Moreover, we do not even know if such traditional measures are well
deﬁned (i.e., exist). To see this I need to introduce a new concept.
For some purposes it useful to know that a preference level obtained with one z ∈ Z can
also be obtained with any other element of Z.
Deﬁnition. An indiﬀerence relation “∼” deﬁned on some e Y ⊆ Y .18 is said to be uniﬁed if
whenever za,zb ∈ Z and (xa,za) ∈ e Y , there exists some (xb,zb) ∈ e Y such that (xa,za) ∼
(xb,zb). A preference relation deﬁned on e Y is said to be uniﬁed if its associated indiﬀerence
relation is uniﬁed.
Economists typically assume that preference is uniﬁed. In particular, this property is locally
necessary for the application of any of our standard compensating welfare measures such
as EV . However, non-uniﬁed preferences may be useful in capturing the eﬀect of dramatic
state preference variables such as the loss of a child or some catastrophic environmental
state variable. Theorem 1 tells us that Φ(b x) always includes both uniﬁed and non-uniﬁed
preferences.19 Thus we cannot determine from the demand function whether our standard
welfare measures are globally well deﬁned.
Finally, suppose that a traditional demand function b x(p,w) can be obtained with an
ordinary utility function u(x), but that there is also a state preference variable z that might
aﬀect preference (we do not know if it does or does not). Then any utility function of the form
g(u(x),z) would yield the same demand function. Thus the lack of demand sensitivity to
17For any ﬁxed (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ b Y with za  = zb.
18Formally, an indiﬀerence relation on a set B is based on a complete partition of the set into indiﬀerence
sets, I = {Ii ⊆ B}. The indiﬀerence relation is then a binary relation deﬁned on elements of B represented
by “∼” such that for a,b ∈ B, a ∈ Ia, b ∈ Ib with Ia,Ib ∈ I, we have a ∼ b if and only if Ia = Ib. At the
extreme, this deﬁnition allows for indiﬀerence relations where each Ii is a singleton and a ∼ b ⇔ a = b. As
the individual sets become larger (and fewer), an indiﬀerence relation includes more indiﬀerence information
in that we are then able to say “a ∼ b” for more pairs a,b ∈ B. Sometimes an indiﬀerence relation may be
speciﬁed by some rule of the form “If x,y ∈ B share some property A, then x ∼ y.” The actual indiﬀerence
relation is then deﬁned by the transitive closure with respect to this property, which thus determines a
partition on B.
19For example if %i∈ Φ(b x) is uniﬁed with representative utility function ui, then for any ﬁxed z0 ∈ Z, the
preference relation represented by
uj(x,z) =
(
tanh(ui(x,z)), if z = z0,
ui(x,z), if z  = z0.
,
is a non-uniﬁed element of Φ(b x). The hyperbolic tangent function tanh( ) maps [0,∞) to [0,1). For any
non-uniﬁed preference it is also possible to specify a g-transform that will convert it into a uniﬁed preference.
7potential state preference variables cannot by itself be used to preclude preference sensitivity,
and oﬀers no particular help in identifying the “true” underlying preference relation.20 Again,
what we need is additional preference information (API). In the rest of the paper, I ﬁrst
specify a structure for characterizing the missing preference information that allows us to
know when some suggested API is suﬃcient and test the API when it is more than suﬃcient,
and then close with several examples.
3 Reference Sets and Seed Relations
Reference sets and seed relations provide a way of specifying the additional information
required to identify a unique complete preference relation on b Y . As will be seen, they
can also be used to provide precise characterizations of the various preference restrictions
prevalent in the literature that allow us to determine precisely when these restrictions can be
tested against revealed preference information. With a ﬁxed reference set and seed preference
relations we can uniquely specify each element of Φ(b x).
The reference set concept is illustrated with Figure 2 using the same indiﬀerence curves
depicted in Figure 1. Recall that each of these curves drawn in X space actually represents
an indiﬀerence set in X × Z, with z ﬁxed in parts (a) and (b) at either z = za or z = zb
respectively. A horizontal line has been added in both parts of the ﬁgure representing the set
XR = {(x1,x2) ∈ ℜ2
+ |x2 = x0
2}, for some ﬁxed value x0
2. As will be demonstrated shortly, XR
provides a common frame of reference between the two sets of indiﬀerence curves presented
in the two parts of Figure 2, and is hence called a reference set. In general, a reference set
is some subset of the choice set, XR ⊆ X.
With this common frame of reference and some additional information we can compare
the Ia and Ib indiﬀerence sets, and thereby establish a complete preference relation on b Y .
With Figure 2, suppose for example that we knew the consumer is indiﬀerent between za
and zb for any ﬁxed x ∈ XR: (x,za) ∼Y (x,zb). Then from (x1
1,x0
2,za) ∼Y (x1
1,x0
2,zb),
with (x1
1,x0
2,za) ∈ Ia
2 and (x1
1,x0
2,zb) ∈ Ib
2, we know that the consumer does not perceive any
preference distinction between the Ia
2 and Ib
2 indiﬀerence sets, and thus is indiﬀerent between
all the (x,z) points in Ia
2
S
Ib
2. Similarly the consumer is also indiﬀerent between all points
in Ia
3
S
Ib
4. Thus we can combine an understanding of preference on XR × Z with revealed
preference to establish a preference relation on all of b Y , showing for example that each point
in Ia
3 is preferred to each point in Ib
3. The preference relation on XR × Z is called a seed
relation. I ﬁrst discuss some properties of reference sets, and then the role of seed relations.
3.1 Reference Set Properties
There are four desirable properties of reference sets and I begin with three of them. A
reference set XR is said to be suﬃcient if for any (x,z) ∈ b Y we can always ﬁnd some
xR ∈ XR that is in the same %z indiﬀerence set as x, that is x ∼z xR. A reference set is
20The lack of demand sensitivity only tells us that %za=%zb for all za,zb ∈ Z.
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Figure 2: A complete non-redundant reference set.
termed non-redundant if the just discussed xR is always unique.21 A reference set XR is non-
redundant if and only if the indiﬀerence sets of XR
T b X under each %z are all singletons. For
example, the x2 = x0
2 line in Figure 2 intersects each indiﬀerence curve at exactly one point.
Finally, a subset of X is said to be naturally ordered if each element is either monotonically
superior or monotonically inferior to any other element.22 The ﬁrst two properties depend
on the demand function via revealed preference while the third does not. The reference set
depicted in Figure 2 is suﬃcient, non-redundant and naturally ordered for Z = {za,zb}.
There are also some useful relationships between these three properties. With the follow-
ing theorem we know that any naturally ordered reference set is universally non-redundant
for all demand functions.
Theorem 2. A naturally ordered reference set XR ⊆ X is non-redundant for any feasible
demand function b x : ℜL
++ × Z × ℜ++ → ℜL, for any possible Z.
While a reference set that is non-redundant with a given demand function might not be
naturally ordered, the next theorem shows that any universally non-redundant reference set
must be naturally ordered.
21More formally, a reference set XR is redundant if for some (x,z) ∈ b Y , there are x1
R,x2
R ∈ XR with
x1
R  = x2
R such that x ∼z x1
R and x ∼z x2
R.
22Formally, a set e X ⊆ X is naturally ordered if for any x1,x2 ∈ e X with x1  = x2, we have either x1 ≤ x2
or x2 ≤ x1. Editorial note: This terminology indicates that we immediately know the complete preference
ordering on XR for all %z. Alternatively, we could say that XR is monotone. However in practice that would
create confusion with monotone preference, such as with Theorems P2 and P3 (next subsection).
9Theorem 3. Let XR ⊆ X be a non-redundant reference set for any feasible demand function
b x : ℜL
++ × Z × ℜ++ → ℜL, for any possible Z. Then XR must be naturally ordered.
There is also a useful relationship between suﬃciency and being naturally ordered.
Theorem 4. Let XR ⊆ X such that XR is naturally ordered and suﬃcient. For any ﬁxed
z ∈ Z, if %z can be extended to a monotone relation on X, then XR\{0} ⊆ b X.
As discussed below in the context of weak complementarity, this last theorem can sometimes
be used to substantially simplify testing for suﬃciency.
The notion of universal suﬃciency is not as easily captured as universal non-redundancy.
However some reference sets are more likely to be suﬃcient than others. For example if %Y
is strictly convex and strongly monotone, so that ℜL
++ ⊆ b X (as is typical), then the diagonal
reference set XD = {x ∈ ℜL
+ |xi = xj ∀i,j, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ L} must be suﬃcient. On the other
hand, the reference set depicted in Figure 2 may be insuﬃcient in the same circumstance.23
Unfortunately, in many situations the most natural or convenient reference set does not have
this universal quality (as we see below with our main example, weak complementarity).
Our last reference set property builds upon suﬃciency and redundancy. Sometimes a
proper subset of a suﬃcient redundant reference set is also suﬃcient. In such a case, we
may prefer to use the smaller set as our reference set. Any suﬃcient reference set whereby
the deletion of any point will make the set insuﬃcient is called irreducible. Obviously any
suﬃcient and non-redundant reference set is irreducible. However, many suﬃcient redundant
reference sets are also irreducible. Thus given suﬃciency, non-redundancy is stronger that
irreducibility, as it is also weaker than being naturally ordered.
3.2 Seed Preference Relations and Preference Generation
The desirability of suﬃciency and non-redundancy becomes apparent in the context of seed
preference relations. Given a reference set XR, a seed preference relation, %s, is a complete
and transitive preference relation deﬁned on the set b YR = (XR × Z)
T b Y . Let %s be a b x-
consistent seed preference relation deﬁned on (XR × Z)
T b Y , where XR is a suﬃcient and
non-redundant reference set (given the demand function b x), and let (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ b Y .
Then we know that there are unique xa
R,xb
R ∈ XR such that xa ∼za xa
R and xb ∼zb xb
R, and
we can therefore deﬁne the relation %S∈ Φ(b x) such that (xa,za) %S (xb,zb) if and only if
(xa
R,za) %s (xb
R,zb). Here, we have used the seed preference relation %s deﬁned on b YR to
generate the complete preference relation %S on b Y , where %s and %S are both b x-consistent.
If XR were not suﬃcient, then xa
R does not exist for some (xa,za) ∈ b Y , preventing this
construction and thus leaving %S incomplete. If XR were redundant then xa
R and xb
R might
not be unique. More importantly, with redundancy it becomes harder to specify b x-consistent
seed relations (as will be demonstrated in the applications section).
The purpose of a seed relation is to provide the missing preference information so that
the “true” %b Y ∈ Φ(b x) can be identiﬁed and recovered as the generated preference relation.
23For example, with CES preference, many indiﬀerence curves will not intersect with this reference set.
10The following theorem speciﬁes how individual seed relations uniquely identify elements of
Φ(b x), as well as showing that any %∈ Φ(b x) can be generated by such a seed relation.24
Theorem P1. Given the demand function b x with obtainable set b Y , let XR be a suﬃcient
reference set and deﬁne b YR = (XR × Z)
T b Y .
a. Let %s be a b x-consistent seed preference relation deﬁned on b YR. Then there is a unique
%S∈ Φ(b x) that is consistent with %s on b YR. This %S is said to be generated by %s.
b. Any %S∈ Φ(b x) can be generated by a unique b x-consistent seed preference relation on b YR.
Part a tells us that with the information available from b x and %s, we can identify a unique
element of Φ(b x). Together, parts a and b tell us that with XR ﬁxed there is a one-to-one
relationship between the set of all b x-consistent seed preference relations deﬁned on b YR and
the elements of Φ(b x). Thus with XR ﬁxed, identifying the unique “true” element of Φ(b x) is
equivalent to identifying the unique “true” b x-consistent seed preference relation on b YR.
Theorem P1 does not explicitly deal with redundancy or reducibility. However these prop-
erties aﬀect preference generation as described by the theorem. Suppose that XR is reducible.
Then for any given seed relation, the generated relation %S∈ Φ(b x) can also be generated with
an alternative seed relation deﬁned on a smaller preference domain, ( e XR × Z)
T b Y where
e XR ⊂ XR is also suﬃcient. Thus we may generate each element of Φ(b x) with less additional
preference information. Alternatively, if XR is non-redundant, or at least irreducible, then
in a sense each demand-consistent seed relation represents the minimal additional preference
information required to generate individual elements of Φ(b x). Moreover, as an already suﬃ-
cient reference set is augmented by additional points, the number of possible seed preference
relations is vastly increased but the number of b x-consistent seed relations remains constant.
Consequently, it becomes increasingly diﬃcult to specify a demand-consistent seed preference
relation as the reference set becomes more redundant.
On the other hand, the b x-consistency requirement is quite easy to satisfy if the reference
set is naturally ordered (i.e., “super-non-redundant”). Any b x-consistent preference relation
deﬁned on some e Y ⊆ b Y is strongly monotone.25 However, strong monotonicity does not
imply that a preference relation is b x-consistent. As indicated by the following theorem, a
strongly monotone seed preference relation is always demand-consistent if and only if XR
T b X
is naturally ordered.
24Editorial note: Fourteen theorems are presented in this paper. To help the reader keep track of their
individual roles, I use four distinct numbering sequences. With Theorems 1 through 4 we have already
encountered most of the “regular” sequence. With “P” for “seed Preference,” the three P-theorems presented
in this subsection match up one-to-one with the three I-theorems in the next subsection (“I” for “seed
Indiﬀerence”). Finally, to distinguish between the general aspects of reference sets and seed relations, and
properties that are speciﬁc to particular applications, we have the A-sequence in the applications section.
25 See Lemma 4 in the Appendix. In the realm of Y , without special restrictions on the nature of Z,
notions of monotonic preference can only be concerned with distinctions in the values of x, with z held
ﬁxed. For example, if the elements of Z are not numbers and do not otherwise have a natural order, such as
with Z = {Rain,Snow,Sunshine}, then monotonic preference on Z is meaningless. Therefore, a preference
relation % deﬁned on some e Y ⊆ b Y is strongly monotone if (xa,z) ≻ (xb,z) whenever xa ≥ xb and xa  = xb
for all such (xa,z),(xb,z) ∈ e Y with z ∈ Z.
11Theorem P2. Given the demand function b x with obtainable set b X, let XR be a reference
set and deﬁne b YR = (XR × Z)
T b Y .
a. Let XR
T b X be naturally ordered and let %s be a strongly monotone seed preference relation
on b YR. Then %s is b x-consistent.
b. Let all strongly monotone seed preference relations on b YR be b x-consistent. Then XR
T b X
is naturally ordered.
With XR naturally ordered, XR
T b X is also so that part a of this theorem follows. Thus,
with a naturally ordered reference set, demand-consistency requirements are substantially
weakened in the sense that being strongly monotone is generically a weaker requirement than
being b x-consistent, and typically easier to demonstrate. With Theorems 2, 3, 4 and P2, we
can see that being naturally ordered has implications for non-redundancy, suﬃciency, as well
as demand-consistency.
Part b of Theorem P2 suggests that when the reference set is not naturally ordered it
is possible for a strongly monotone seed relation and a demand function to be mutually
inconsistent. In particular, we know that there must be some strongly monotone seed pref-
erence relation that is not x-consistent.26 This following existence theorem is concerned with
demand-inconsistency from the context of a ﬁxed seed relation.
Theorem P3. Let XR be a reference set that is not naturally ordered and let %s be a
strongly monotone seed preference relation deﬁned on YR = XR×Z. Then %s is not demand-
consistent for an inﬁnite number of valid demand functions.
Thus when the reference set is not naturally ordered, no seed relation is universally valid
with all demand functions so that it is possible to test suggested seed relations against the
demand function in the form of revealed preference. As demonstrated below, Theorems P2
and P3 are together quite useful in specifying when a preference restriction can be tested.
3.3 Seed Indiﬀerence Relations
Heretofore I have been concerned with seed preference relations to generate elements of Φ(b x).
Sometimes we can get by with less seed information in the form of seed indiﬀerence relations.
In the following, after developing some common aspects of indiﬀerence relations, I establish
an important generic case where we can get by with just indiﬀerence information in the
seed relation. I also show that we can get by with less than what may be called “complete”
indiﬀerence information.
A preference relation % and an indiﬀerence relation ∼ deﬁned on the same set A are said
to be associated if a ∼ b ⇔ [a % b and b % a] for all a,b ∈ A.27 There is also a weaker
condition whereby % and ∼ are said to be consistent if a ∼ b ⇒ [a % b and b % a] for all
26From the proof we know that there are an inﬁnite number of demand-inconsistent strongly monotone
seed preference relations (one for each value of α).
27Recall that a indiﬀerence relation is based on a partition of the set. See note 18.
12a,b ∈ A. Given a complete and transitive preference relation, there is a unique associated
indiﬀerence relation and typically many merely consistent indiﬀerence relations.28 However,
for any nontrivial indiﬀerence relation there are is no unique ordering of the individual in-
diﬀerence sets and hence no unique associated preference relation. Thus, the information
content of a indiﬀerence relation is generally less than that of a preference relation deﬁned
on the same preference domain, and the information content of an associated indiﬀerence
relation is more than that of a “merely consistent” relation. The indiﬀerence relation asso-
ciated with any generic %i is represented by ∼i, so that in particular, for any z ∈ Z, the
indiﬀerence relation associated with %z is denoted by ∼z.
To be useful, our deﬁnition of demand-consistency in the case of indiﬀerence relations
needs to be more complicated than our previous deﬁnition for preference relations.
Deﬁnition. Given an extended demand function b x(p,z,w), with identiﬁable z-ﬁxed prefer-
ence relations {%z |z ∈ Z}, an indiﬀerence relation ∼ deﬁned on some e Y ⊆ b Y is b x-consistent
if two conditions hold: 1) For any (xa,z),(xb,z) ∈ e Y with z ∈ Z, we have (xa,z) ∼ (xb,z) ⇒
xa ∼z xb; and 2) For any (x1,za),(x2,zb),(x3,za),(x4,zb) ∈ e Y and za,zb ∈ Z, such that
(x1,za) ∼ (x2,zb) and (x3,za) ∼ (x4,zb), we have x1 %za x3 ⇔ x2 %zb x4.
A stronger version of the ﬁrst condition is also sometimes useful: 1′) For any (xa,z),(xb,z) ∈
e Y with z ∈ Z, (xa,z) ∼ (xb,z) ⇔ xa ∼z xb.
Given a reference set XR, a seed indiﬀerence relation ∼s is an indiﬀerence relation deﬁned
on the set b YR = (XR × Z)
T b Y . With the help of a lemma we can transform the previous
results concerning seed preference relations into similar conclusions about seed indiﬀerence
relations. I begin with a result very similar to Theorem P1,
Theorem I1. Given the demand function b x with obtainable set b Y , let XR be a suﬃcient
reference set, and deﬁne b YR = (XR × Z)
T b Y .
a. Let ∼s be a uniﬁed b x-consistent seed indiﬀerence relation on b YR. Then there is a unique
%S∈ Φ(b x) that is consistent with ∼s on b YR. This %S generated by ∼s is also uniﬁed.
b. Any uniﬁed %S∈ Φ(b x) can be generated by a unique uniﬁed b x-consistent seed indiﬀerence
relation deﬁned on b YR that satisﬁes condition 1′, represented by ∼s. Furthermore, where ∼t
is a uniﬁed b x-consistent seed indiﬀerence relation on b YR, %S can generated by ∼t if and only
if (xa,za) ∼t (xb,zb) ⇒ (xa,za) ∼s (xb,zb) for all (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ b YR.
As before with Theorem P1, this theorem allows us to identify a unique member of Φ(b x)
with the information available from b x and a seed relation. Part a of Theorem I1 provides
suﬃciency conditions for when a seed indiﬀerence relation may generate a complete uniﬁed
preference relation on b Y , while part b tells us that any such uniﬁed element of Φ(b x) can
28Given %, if ∼a is the unique associated indiﬀerence relation and ∼c another merely consistent relation
(∼c =∼a) we have r ∼c s ⇒ r ∼a s for all r,s ∈ A, but for some t,v ∈ A we have t ∼a v and not t ∼c v. The
associated relation ∼a provides a complete account of the indiﬀerence relations implied by %, where as ∼c
does not. Thus the merely consistent indiﬀerence relation is in a sense incomplete. In allowing this kind of
incompleteness, we have a relatively weak understanding of indiﬀerence.
13be generated by possibly several seed indiﬀerence relations, of which exactly one satisﬁes
condition 1′. Thus, “%S is uniﬁed” is a suﬃcient condition for %S to be generated by an
indiﬀerence seed relation on XR.29 With XR ﬁxed, from the uniqueness properties of both
parts of Theorem I1 we have a one-to-one relationship between the set of all possible uniﬁed
b x-consistent seed indiﬀerence relations deﬁned on b YR satisfying condition 1′ and the uniﬁed
elements of Φ(b x). (Recall that only with uniﬁed %∈ Φ(b x) can we be sure that any of our
standard compensating welfare measures such as EV are well deﬁned.)
From part b of Theorem I1, any uniﬁed member of Φ(b x) can be generated by a unique
uniﬁed seed indiﬀerence relation that satisﬁes condition 1′, and often by many relations that
do not satisfy condition 1′. If we use anyone of these latter relations in part a, then we are in
eﬀect using less seed indiﬀerence information to obtain the same outcome as compared with
using the unique relation that satisﬁes condition 1′. As before with seed preference relations,
if XR is reducible we can also lower the information content of each seed indiﬀerence relation
by using a smaller reference set. Thus, the minimal amount of indiﬀerence information
required to generate a uniﬁed %S∈ Φ(b x) is a b x-consistent uniﬁed seed relation that either
does not satisfy condition 1′, or is deﬁned on a non-redundant reference set.30
We also have the following seed indiﬀerence relation equivalents of Theorems P2 and P3,
Theorem I2. Given the demand function b x with obtainable set b X, let XR be a reference set
and deﬁne b YR = (XR × Z)
T b Y .
a. Let XR
T b X be naturally ordered and let ∼s be a strongly monotone seed indiﬀerence
relation on b YR. Then ∼s is b x-consistent and satisﬁes condition 1′.31
b. Let all strongly monotone uniﬁed seed indiﬀerence relation on b YR be b x-consistent. Then
XR
T b X is naturally ordered.
Theorem I3. Let XR be a reference set that is not naturally ordered and let ∼s be a uniﬁed
seed indiﬀerence relation deﬁned on YR = XR × Z. Then ∼s is not demand-consistent for
an inﬁnite number of valid demand functions.
With the two series of theorems, P1, P2 & P3 and I1, I2 & I3, we can respectively work
with either seed preference relations or uniﬁed seed indiﬀerence relations. The ﬁrst theorem
of both series is the main preference generation theorem that allows us to identify unique
members of Φ(b x), while the second and third theorems are concerned with the relationship
between demand-consistency and whether the reference set is naturally ordered. These four
29It is not a necessary condition as there always exist non-uniﬁed elements of Φ(b x) that can be generated
by seed indiﬀerence relations. However, it is a necessary screen in that there also always exist non-uniﬁed
elements of Φ(b x) that cannot be generated by seed indiﬀerence relations.
30With a non-redundant reference set, any b x-consistent seed indiﬀerence relation also satisﬁes condition
1′.
31An indiﬀerence relation deﬁned on some e Y ⊆ b Y is said to be strongly monotone if it is consistent with
a strongly monotone preference relation deﬁned on e Y . Then any b x-consistent uniﬁed indiﬀerence relation
deﬁned on some e Y ⊆ b Y is strongly monotone. This follows from Lemma 5 and a previous observation. See
note 25.
14latter theorems are used extensively in the following examples as tools in helping us discern
when possible API speciﬁcations may be tested against revealed preference. The relationships
between reference set properties as speciﬁed by Theorems 2, 3 and 4 also support this work.
4 Application with Preference Assumptions
Applications with state preference variables in the literature typically invoke some assump-
tion about preference that enables the analyst to suﬃciently identify %Y so that some welfare
measure may be speciﬁed. Each such assumption is an instance of Additional Preference
Information. These suggested API’s can be speciﬁed with the just developed preference-
theoretic structure in a systematic way that allows us to state whether they are suﬃcient
to identify a unique b x-consistent complete preference relation on b Y , and also whether they
can be tested against revealed preference information. To demonstrate this, I ﬁrst present
an in-depth analysis of weak complementarity and the related concept of existence value,
followed by shorter looks at ﬁve other applications including two important API concepts
from the price index literature for product quality, and also a treatment of the new and
disappearing goods problem.
4.1 Weak Complementarity and Existence Value
Most state preference variable applications in the literature are concerned with environmental
variables, product quality, or traditional public goods such as local roads. Therefore, it is
particulary appropriate to start oﬀ with “weak complementarity,” a speciﬁc API that has
been used in all three areas. The notion of weak complementarity was introduced by M¨ aler
as a methodology to estimate the beneﬁts of improving an environmental quality variable
such as the quality of a sport ﬁshery stock or of lake water for swimming.32 It requires that
a given state preference variable be associated with one of the market goods in a manner
such that it is reasonable to assume that the consumer is indiﬀerent between values of the
state preference variable when she is consuming a zero amount of the market good. With
M¨ aler’s ﬁrst example, the state preference variable is the quality of a sport ﬁshery and the
market good is the use of that ﬁshery. In this case weak complementarity applies in that we
might reasonably assume that non-ﬁshermen do not care about the quality of the ﬁshery,
i.e., ﬁshing and the quality of the ﬁshery are weak complements.
With weak complementarity we are assuming the consumer only cares about the state
preference variable as it aﬀects the beneﬁt she derives from her personal consumption of the
market good. That is to say, the state preference variable does not have “existence value” – I
derive no beneﬁt from the existence of a public good that is a quality of a private good unless
I consume that private good. However reasonable this assumption may sound, forbidding
existence value is an explicitly restrictive modelling assumption that precludes many valid
preference relations. For example, I may prefer a strong sport ﬁshery so that I will always
32The concept was ﬁrst developed in M¨ aler (1971) and the terminology was introduced in M¨ aler (1974).
15have the option of using it, or perhaps because my good friend enjoys ﬁshing.
The ﬁrst step in applying the structure developed here with a given API is specifying a
reference set and seed relation that together capture the deﬁning characteristics of the API.
Suppose that z and the private good x1 are weak complements. Then “no existence value”
requires (x,za) ∼Y (x,zb) for all x ∈ X such that x1 = 0, and all za,zb ∈ Z.33 We thus have
a ready-made reference set XWC = {x ∈ X |x1 = 0} and a uniﬁed seed indiﬀerence relation
deﬁned by (x,za) ∼wc (x,zb) for all x ∈ XWC and all za,zb ∈ Z.34 With these we are ready
for a precise consideration of weak complementarity as an API to supplement the revealed
preference information in order to identify a unique element of Φ(b x).
Preference generation as speciﬁed by Theorem I1 part a requires that XWC be suﬃcient
and ∼wc be b x-consistent. For every (xa,z) ∈ b Y , suﬃciency of XWC necessitates the existence
of some (0,xb
−1) ∈ XWC such that xa ∼z (0,xb
−1).35 In the words of Willig (1978), this means
that with any ﬁxed z “any bundle including good 1 can be matched in the [identiﬁable %z]
preference ordering by some other bundle which excludes good 1” so that x1 is “nonessential.”
Therefore, implementing weak complementarity requires two properties, no existence value
and the nonessentiality of x1. In the context of Theorem I1, the ﬁrst property is associated
with b x-consistency of ∼wc and the second with the suﬃciency of XWC.
Testing for suﬃciency and demand-consistency would be the next natural step in applying
this methodology based on reference sets and seed relations. Given a complete demand
function b x : P × Z × W → X, suﬃciency can always be tested against revealed preference,
and demand-consistency of a speciﬁc seed relation is only sometimes testable.36 For both
properties, testing is aﬀected by whether or not the reference set is naturally ordered. With
our current application, XWC is naturally ordered if and only if X = ℜ2
+.
Suﬃciency in the form of nonessentiality holds if and only if for every (xa,z) ∈ b Y there
exists some (0,xb
−1) ∈ b X such that xa ∼z (0,xb
−1). From b x, we can identify the obtainable set
b X and revealed preference in form of {%z |z ∈ Z}. Thus nonessentiality can always be fully
veriﬁed with revealed preference. However, this may necessitate examining all %z indiﬀerence
sets in b X for all z ∈ Z. With XWC naturally ordered we do have additional one-way tests of
33The no existence value aspect of weak complementarity is usually deﬁned in the literature in terms of a
partial directive and a utility function such as
∂u(0,x2,x3,...,xL,z)
∂z
= 0,
for state preference variable z associated with good 1. However this deﬁnition only applies with continuous
state preference variables for which the derivative is well deﬁned.
34This is a valid indiﬀerence relation as it clearly deﬁnes a partition on XWC × Z; this partition includes
exactly one set for each x ∈ XWC. (See Note 18 for the relationship between indiﬀerence and partitions.)
35Here I adopt the notational convention x−1 = (x2,...,xL) so that x = (x1,x−1).
36This testability depends on our assumption that the given demand function is fully known. If instead,
for example, the demand function was estimated from a more limited data set using a parametric form that
assumed either nonessentiality or no existence value, then we have eﬀectively assumed away our ability to
test these issues by the methods described here.
16nonessentiality that might save some labor. Theorem 4 allows us to reject suﬃciency by only
examining the membership of a naturally ordered reference set. In particular, with X = ℜ2
+
we can reject nonessentiality if for any z ∈ Z, %z is consistent with a monotone relation on
X and we ﬁnd some x ∈ XWC where x  = 0 and x / ∈ b X. We thus have a separate one-way
test of nonessentiality for each distinct %z, z ∈ Z. With each such test, all we have to do
is linearly scan the reference set looking for a nonzero element that is not obtainable. For a
very simple example, if any %z is Cobb-Douglas then b X
T
XWC = ∅ so that we may reject
nonessentiality on the basis of Theorem 4.
We can test the demand-consistency of ∼wc if and only if L > 2 (where X = ℜL
+). When
such testing is permitted, we can either aﬃrm or reject so that we have a two-way test of
b x-consistency. However, we have at most only a one-way test concerning the “true” %b Y . If
X = ℜ2
+, then XWC is naturally ordered and hence by Theorem I2 we know that ∼wc is
automatically b x-consistent,37 and as a consequence we cannot use revealed preference to test
the no existence value hypothesis. On the other hand, if X = ℜL
+ with L > 2, XWC is not
naturally ordered and possibly redundant (recall Theorem 3) and therefore ∼wc might not
be b x-consistent. Moreover, Theorem I3 guarantees the existence of demand functions for
which ∼wc is in fact not demand-consistent. Thus demand-consistency requires additional
special conditions. Typically such conditions may be found by simply applying the deﬁnition
of b x-consistency with the seed relation. In this case, we thereby obtain the property of
“single-preference.” We say that a demand function is single-preferenced on some e X ⊆ X
if all the identiﬁable z-ﬁxed preference relations are identical on this restricted set. More
formally, for all possible pairs za,zb ∈ Z and all x1,x2 ∈ e X
T b X, single-preference requires
x1 %za x2 ⇔ x1 %zb x2. We then have our ﬁrst applications theorem,
Theorem A1. The weak complementarity seed indiﬀerence relation ∼wc is demand-consistent
if and only if the demand function is single-preferenced on XWC.
Thus whenever we observe demand that is not single-preferenced on XWC, we must reject
“no existence value,” so that there is no element of Φ(b x) that is consistent with ∼wc. On the
other hand when b x is single-preferenced XWC, we know that there does exist some member
of Φ(b x) that can be generated from ∼wc in the context of Theorem I1. However, we cannot
aﬃrm that this member is the “true” %b Y . It is in this sense that Theorem A1 only provides
a one-way test of no existence value, and hence of weak complementarity.
With L = 2, demand is trivially always single preferenced on XWC and ∼wc is auto-
matically b x-consistent, so that Theorem A1 is not informative. However with L > 2, this
theorem is meaningful since neither single preference nor demand-consistency is then auto-
matic. From Theorems I2 and I3, we understand that this ability to test b x-consistency is
a consequence of XWC not being naturally ordered. However, I believe our intuitive under-
standing of this should focus on the redundancy of the reference set. With this redundancy
it is possible to obtain contradictions when we apply a seed relation with the reference set,
37Application of Theorem I2 part a requires that ∼wc be strongly monotone. The seed preference relation
deﬁned by (0,xa
2,za) %wc (0,xb
2,zb) ⇔ xa
2 ≥ xb
2 is strongly monotone and also associated with ∼wc. Therefore
∼wc is also strongly monotone.
17contradictions that refute demand-consistency.38
Weak complementarity is a good example for demonstrating the advantages of using
condition 1 rather than 1′ in deﬁning demand-consistency for indiﬀerence relations. If I had
instead used condition 1′ then ∼wc as currently deﬁned would be deﬁcient since with L > 2 it
would not satisfy the requirement that xa ∼z xb ⇒ (xa,z) ∼wc (xb,z) for any z ∈ Z and any
xa,xb ∈ b X
T
XWC with xa  = xb. Satisfying this requirement would necessitate additional
statements in the seed relation deﬁnition that simply replicate revealed preference informa-
tion so that the deﬁnition is no longer fully speciﬁed independently of the demand function.
Moreover this additional seed indiﬀerence information is not necessary for preference gener-
ation, and with it we would lose the simple intuitive clarity of our current deﬁnition. With
weak complementarity I have reduced the seed relation information in two ways from what
it might be otherwise, ﬁrst by using a seed indiﬀerence relation instead of a seed preference
relation and by second by availing ourselves of condition 1 instead of 1′.
With our methodology it is possible to extend a result such as Theorem A1 so that we
are able to characterize the entire membership of Φ(b x). In particular, we are able to reject
“no existence value” (in the form of ∼wc) as indicated by Theorem A1 if and only if we can
also reject a speciﬁc kind of existence value. By deﬁnition, existence value occurs when the
consumer has strict preference distinctions between z values when x1 = 0. These preference
distinctions generally depend on the quantities of the remaining commodities. We say that
there is a separable existence value if the preference interaction between z and x−1 depends
only on a simple aggregate metric of the commodity values. More formally, a preference
relation on b Y has separable existence value if its restriction to XWC ×Z can be speciﬁed by
some %sx where,
(x
a,z
a) %sx (x
b,z
b) ⇔ (u(x
a),z
a) %UZ (u(x
b),z
b), (3)
for all (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ b YWC = (XWC × Z)
T b Y , where u is some utility function on XWC
and %UZ is a preference relation deﬁned on ℜ×Z.39 Equation (3) is also valid in the case of
no existence value so that the latter may be regarded as a special case of separable existence
value.40 If existence value instead depends on the individual values of the x−1 vector in a
manner that cannot be captured by equation (3) then it is nonseparable. We might expect
this if the existence value has a particular relationship with speciﬁc consumption goods other
than x1. With L = 2 the distinction between separable and nonseparable existence value
degenerates so that all preference relations on b Y trivially have separable existence value.
The following theorem gives us a strong relationship between the two types of existence
value and whether the demand function is single-preferenced on XWC.
38Also recall the close link between naturally ordered and redundancy as speciﬁed by Theorems 2 and 3.
39Editorial note: The “sx” of %sx is for “separable existence,” and the “UZ” of %UZ refers to the preference
domain as the cross of utility values and Z.
40Therefore, for some purposes we may want a more strict notion of separable existence value that requires
%UZ to be active in z such that there exists some x ∈ XWC and za,zb ∈ Z so that (u(x),za) ≻UZ (u(x),zb).
18Theorem A2. If b x is single-preferenced on XWC, then all members of Φ(b x) have separable
existence value.41 Otherwise all members of Φ(b x) have nonseparable existence value.
Each instance of %sx as deﬁned by equation (3) is a seed preference relation so that we can
apply Theorem P1, just as we applied Theorem I1 with the seed indiﬀerence relation ∼wc.
However preference generation with either of these theorems requires the seed relations be b x-
consistent. Theorems A1 and A2 tell us that demand-consistency of these seed relations can
be tested by determining if demand is single-preferenced. Theorem A2 generalizes Theorem
A1.42 Previously, with only Theorem A1, we could reject “no existence value” if demand is
not single-preferenced, while now with Theorem A2, we can also reject all separable existence
value seed relations. Moreover, Theorem A1 gave us only had a one-way test in that we could
not aﬃrm the nature of the “true” seed relation – we could not state that the seed relation
must be ∼wc. However with Theorem A2 we have a two-way test such that with single
preferenced demand we can state that the true seed relation must have the form of %sx.
The distinction is that ∼wc is a speciﬁc seed relation, while %sx is a seed relation form that
admits a whole class individual seed relations as speciﬁed by all the feasible %SX.43
Application of these theorems depends on Theorems P2 and I2 since they tell us that
we can reject seed relations only when XWC is not naturally ordered, i.e., when L > 2 so
that single-preference is not a degenerate property. Theorem I3 provided the initial basis for
developing this context-speciﬁc analytic structure. From it we knew that special conditions
are required to guarantee demand-consistency of ∼wc when L > 2, giving us an impetus
to ﬁnd those conditions in the form of single-preferenced demand on XWC as stated in
Theorem A1. Then recognizing the general implications of single-preference, we extended
our results with Theorem A2 to all separable existence value seed relations, thereby providing
a characterization of all the entire Φ(b x) set that depends only on the observable property as
to whether b x is single-preferenced.
In general, if a reference set XR is complete but not naturally ordered, then the demand
function and seed relation together provide an overabundance of preference information so
that the generated relation is over-determined. Trusting the empirical demand information,
I have developed a structure which uses this excess information to test the feasibility of
proposed seed relations. However if the researcher is quite conﬁdent with a given seed
relation, the same process of testing for demand-consistency could instead be used to test
the accuracy of demand information. For example, if in a speciﬁc context the logical case
for weak complementarity seems irrefutable, then an estimated demand function that is not
single-preferenced on XWC would be suspect.
On the other hand, if the researcher has no need to test either source of preference
41Where again “no existence value” is a special case of separable existence value.
42Ignoring the technical distinctions between indiﬀerence and preference seed relations.
43With b x single-preferenced on XWC, it can be shown that for any %SX relation that is strictly monotone
on u, there is an element of Φ(b x) whose restriction to (XWC × Z)
T b Y can be represented by a preference
relation deﬁned by equation (3) using this %SX. Thus Φ(b x) includes elements for all possible separable
existence value structures (including “no existence value”) as represented by all the feasible %SX relations.
19information, we can reduce the information requirements so that the generated relation is
no longer over-identiﬁed, i.e., so that the seed relation is automatically demand-consistent.
With weak complementarity, one simple but extreme example would be to treat all the
other commodities as a single composite commodity so that we force L = 2, and thereby
radically reduce the required preference information from both the demand function and
seed relation. However, with our structure we can usually get automatic demand-consistency
without changing L by simply selecting a new naturally ordered reference set that is a subset
of the previous reference set. The seed relation is then redeﬁned as the simple restriction
of the old relation with respect to the new reference set. While this clearly reduces the
amount of seed preference information, it can also be interpreted, perhaps more usefully, as
a reduction in the required demand preference information.
In the context of weak complementarity, this process may be thought of as a strengthening
of nonessentiality and a consequent weakening of the no existence value requirement. For
example, with L > 2 suppose that (0,x−1) ∈ b X for any x−1 ∈ ℜ
L−1
++ . Then XWC is clearly
reducible, so that we might consider an alternative suﬃcient reference set that is naturally
ordered such as XD1 ⊂ XWC deﬁned by XD1 = {x ∈ X |x1 = 0,xi = xj for all 1 <
i,j ≤ L}.44 The suﬃciency of XD1 may be formally interpreted as a strengthening of
nonessentiality such that “any bundle including good 1 can be matched in the preference
ordering by some other bundle which excludes good 1 and where all other goods are of
the same quantity.” With XD1, ∼wc is automatically b x-consistent. This weakens the no
existence value requirement so that now the consumer is allowed to care about diﬀerences
in the state preference variable with x1 = 0 if xi  = xj for some 1 < i,j ≤ L. This example
with XD1 suggests a whole family of possible extensions to the basic weak complementarity
assumptions, some of which may be intuitive in some contexts.
Changing the preference domain of ∼wc from XWC × Z to XD1 × Z clearly reduces the
amount of seed indiﬀerence information. On a practical level this can also be interpreted as
a reduction in the required revealed preference information. Nonessentiality formally only
requires that each z-ﬁxed indiﬀerence surface include at least one point in XWC. However,
with L > 2 it is diﬃcult to imagine indiﬀerence surfaces that would include only one such
point. Instead, the nonempty intersection of any z-ﬁxed indiﬀerence surface with XWC would
typically be a non-trivial curve or surface. Previously we required complete knowledge of
each %z on the preference domain b X, including all such preference information in XWC.
This information is obtained as revealed preference from the demand function when x1 = 0,
and therefore may be particularly diﬃcult to obtain: tracking the consumption of an item
may be simpler than tracking non-consumption. However, with a weakened nonessentiality
requirement deﬁned with respect to a complete naturally ordered reference set such as XD1,
we need the preference information for only one point in XWC on each z-ﬁxed indiﬀerence
surface in order to identify an almost complete b x-consistent preference relation on b Y .45 Thus
the required revealed preference information for points in XWC is substantially reduced.
44This is the diagonal reference set in the ℜ
L−1
+ space deﬁned by x1 = 0. When L = 2, XD1 = XWC.
45It is “almost” complete because we may not be able to recover preferences between other points in XWC.
204.2 Other Examples
The preceding analysis of weak complementarity and existence value illustrates the depth
of analysis possible with this methodology. Five shorter applications presented here provide
some indication of the possible breadth of analysis. These include two brief examples closely
related to weak complementarity, two from the price index literature concerned with product
quality, and ﬁnally a treatment of the problem of new and disappearing goods. These
examples especially diﬀer in the choice of a most convenient reference set.
The ﬁrst two and last examples use a common seed relation deﬁnition that we have
already seen. For any reference set XR, one possible seed indiﬀerence relation is the “neutral
relation” deﬁned by (x,za) ∼n (x,zb) for all x ∈ XR and all za,zb ∈ Z.46 The weak
complementarity seed relation is an example of the neutral relation, as is the seed relation
discussed at the beginning of the main section in the context of Figure 2. On the other hand,
most instances of the %sx seed relation form are “non-neutral” seed relations.
After substantial consideration of weak complementarity, Smith and Banzhaf (2004) in
their closing section brieﬂy consider two other potential APIs that can also be speciﬁed by
the neutral seed relation. The ﬁrst generalizes weak complementarity so that the consumer
does not care about z as long as x1 ≤ x0
1 for some ﬁxed x0
1 ≥ 0. For the example given,
z is the availability of campsites in a wilderness area and x1 is the length of a hike in the
wilderness, so that any x1 ≤ x0
1 represents a day-hike and hence does not require camping
facilities. In this case the natural reference set is clearly X≤x0
1 = {x ∈ X |x1 ≤ x0
1}.47
Let x0
1 > 0 so that this reference set is typically suﬃcient48 but not naturally ordered
(with L > 1). Then from Theorem I3 we know that special conditions are again required
to ensure demand-consistency. These conditions imply a result very similar to Theorem A1
requiring demand to be single-preferenced on X≤x0
1. We can also obtain a result similar
to Theorem A2 as it relates to equation (3) but where the preference seed relation form is
instead deﬁned on X≤x0
1×Z; Φ(b x) either contains only preference relations that are consistent
with this seed relation form, or contains no such member. Smith and Banzhaf’s proposed
API is only feasible in the ﬁrst instance. The main diﬀerence from before is that these results
now also have meaning when L = 2 (demand-consistency is not automatic).
Smith and Banzhaf’s third API involves “weak substitution” as introduced by Feenberg
and Mills.49 Here the consumer does not care about z as long as x1 ≥ x0
1, with x0
1 again
ﬁxed. With the Smith and Banzhaf speciﬁcation as applied to Feenberg and Mills’ original
education example, x1 is the quantity of private education and z is the quality of public
education. Increased consumption of private education is associated with lower consumption
of public education so that at some point the consumer no longer cares about the quality
of public education. This API is fully speciﬁed by applying the neutral seed indiﬀerence
46The consumer is “neutral” (or apathetic) about distinctions in z for any ﬁxed x ∈ XR.
47So that X≤x0
1 = XWC when x0
1 = 0.
48However there are exceptions such as when one or more %z have CES preference.
49Feenberg and Mills (1980), p.80.
21relation with the reference set X≥x0
1 = {x ∈ X |x1 ≥ x0
1}. All of the results with X≤x0
1
discussed in the immediately preceding paragraph also apply here in an obvious way.
Our two examples with product quality in the context of price indexes are based on the
seminal work by Fisher and Shell50 with some subsequent development by Willig (1978). The
ﬁrst example concerns repackaging, so that with the classic shrinking candy bar example,
we might expect preference (or utility) to depend on the total volume consumed of a given
candy type (e.g. ounces) rather than on the number of bars irrespective of size. Fisher and
Shell ﬁrst provide a general formulation of repackaging such that
(x
a,z
a) %rp (x
b,z
b) ⇔ U(f(x
a
1,z
a),x
a
−1) ≥ U(f(x
b
1,z
b),x
b
−1), (4)
for all (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ b Y where z is a quality vector for good x1, and with appropriately
deﬁned real valued functions U and f.51 The special case of “pure repackaging,” such as
with the candy bar example, is then captured by imposing a multiplicative restriction on the
functional form, f(x1,z) = x1h(z), so that preference for a good with per unit satisfaction
content h(z) depends on the product of that satisfaction content and the number of items.
For this example application with %pr I shall assume that b X = ℜL
++ so that b Y = ℜL
++ × Z.
Repackaging is a universal property in the sense that it requires equation (4) to be true
for all x vectors. Thus our reference set is naturally deﬁned as the entirety of X = ℜL
+ which
is always suﬃcient, redundant and not naturally ordered (with L > 1). Thus we can apply
Theorem P3 (as we have previously applied Theorem I3) requiring additional conditions for
demand-consistency. However we typically do not start out with speciﬁc U and f functions,
and therefore have a somewhat diﬀerent demand-consistency question. Given the demand
function b x, we instead want to know if there are any U and f functions such that %rp is
b x-consistent. Or, if we are concerned with pure repackaging, we wish to verify the existence
of U and h functions. Thus we are not concerned with verifying the demand-consistency of
any speciﬁc seed relation, but rather the feasibility of the form given by equation (4).
As is evident from Theorem A2, the methodology presented in this paper can be used
to draw conclusions about the demand-consistency of general seed forms such as %sx and
%rp. We shall see that demand-consistency of the %rp preference form requires a condition
that bears some similarity to single-preference. Suppose there exists some U and f functions
such that %rp is b x-consistent. For this application we shall adopt a simplifying assumption
similar to uniﬁed preference: for any xa
1 > 0 and za,zb ∈ Z there exists some xb
1 > 0 so
that f(xa
1,za) = f(xb
1,zb). (In the case of pure repackaging we only need h > 0 so that
xb
1 = xa
1h(za)/h(zb) > 0.) Thus with x−1 ﬁxed, any change in the “packaging” of good 1 can
be oﬀset by a change in the quantity consumed so that the consumer is left indiﬀerent. This
is represented by the function χ so that xb
1 = χ(xa
1,za,zb). Then for any xαa
1 ,x
βa
1 ∈ ℜ++,
xα
−1,x
β
−1 ∈ ℜ
L−1
++ and za,zb ∈ Z, demand-consistency of %rp implies
(x
αa
1 ,x
α
−1) %za (x
βa
1 ,x
β
−1) ⇔ (x
αb
1 ,x
α
−1) %zb (x
βb
1 ,x
β
−1), (5)
50Fisher and Shell (1971) as originally published in Griliches (1971) has omitted notation (especially
brackets) with much of the displayed mathematical type and is consequently often diﬃcult to read. These
typesetting errors are corrected in the version subsequently published in Fisher and Shell (1972).
51See Fisher and Shell (1971) equation (5.15).
22where xαb
1 = χ(xαa
1 ,za,zb) and x
βb
1 = χ(x
βa
1 ,za,zb).52
To more easily see the similarity with single-preference, let xαa
1 = x
βa
1 ≡ xa
1 so that we
also have xαb
1 = x
βb
1 ≡ xb
1. Then equation (5) simpliﬁes to
(x
a
1,x
α
−1) %za (x
a
1,x
β
−1) ⇔ (x
b
1,x
α
−1) %zb (x
b
1,x
β
−1), (6)
so that the restricted preference relation on all x−1 ∈ ℜ
L−1
++ is the same with (xa
1,za) and
(xb
1,zb). This compares with single-preferenced demand such as on XWC where the restricted
preference relation on all x−1 ∈ ℜ
L−1
++ is the same with for all za,zb ∈ Z when x1 = 0. This
simpler equation also suggests a one-way test for b x-consistency of the %rp form utilizing
revealed preference in the form of {%z |z ∈ Z}. Simply choose some xa
1, za and zb, and
systematically look for some xb
1 so that this simpler equation is valid, i.e., where we ﬁnd the
same preference relation on x−1 with (xb
1,zb) as we did with (xa
1,za). Demand-consistency
must be rejected if there is no such xb
1. To be more precise, we must reject either b x-consistency
or the existence of χ. When %rp is b x-consistent, the existence of χ has a strong intuitive
appeal that is allied with the compensating aspect of the price indexing concept. We will
reject b x-consistency if this intuition is stronger than that of demand-consistency itself. With
pure repackaging there is an especially strong case for the existence of χ.
However, even if this test is passed for all possible combinations of xa
1, za and zb, demand-
consistency is not guaranteed.53 Instead, as indicated by the following theorem, we need the
existence of a χ function whereby equation (5) is universally valid.
Theorem A3. Given b x, let a function χ exist such that for any xαa
1 ,x
βa
1 ∈ ℜ++, xα
−1,x
β
−1 ∈
ℜ
L−1
++ and za,zb ∈ Z, equation (5) is valid with xαb
1 = χ(xαa
1 ,za,zb) and x
βb
1 = χ(x
βa
1 ,za,zb).
Then some functions U and f exist such that %rp as deﬁned by equation (4) is b x-consistent.
This gives us a two-way test of demand-consistency: the %rp seed form is b x-consistent if
and only if equation 5 is satisﬁed for some χ function. However as just noted, rejection of
demand-consistency depends on the intuitive appeal of χ.
If the conditions of Theorem A3 are satisﬁed then we know that there exists at least one
repackaging preference relation that is demand-consistent. However, it will generally not be
unique. In particular from Theorem 1, a %rp preference relation will be uniquely demand-
consistent only if there are no other functions Ualt and falt such that Ualt(falt(x1,z),x−1) =
g(U(f(x1,z),x−1),z) for some g-transform g(U,z) that is an active function of z.54 For ex-
ample, it will not be unique if U is either additively or multiplicatively separable in its ﬁrst
argument.55 Therefore we cannot typically use revealed preference information to identify a
52Equation (5) is obtained by directly applying the deﬁnition of b x-consistent preference relations with
equation (4) and the χ function.
53For example this test never fails when L = 2 even though there exist preference relations that cannot
be speciﬁed with equation (4).
54Because the reference set is all of X and we have a utility representation, we are able to use Theorem
1 to directly characterize φ(b x). Our previous tool for such characterizations, Theorem P1 part b, does not
tell us anything meaningful with this reference set since each seed relation is its own generated relation.
55That is if either U(f,x−1) = f + ¯ U(x−1) or U(f,x−1) = f   ¯ U(x−1) for some real valued function ¯ U.
23unique repackaging preference relation. Thus again, like Theorem A2 we have a result con-
cerning a preference relation form that provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions for when
there exists demand-consistent representatives of this form, but which permits a large class
of such demand-consistent representatives (%sx is never unique and %rp is rarely unique).
If we are speciﬁcally interested in the demand-consistency of the pure repackaging pref-
erence form, Theorem A3 needs to be strengthened such that the required χ function must
have the form x1¯ χ(za,zb) for some function ¯ χ : Z × Z → ℜ. Willig (1978) examines pure
repackaging for the more specialized case where x1 is nonessential, z has no existence value,
and utility and demand functions are diﬀerentiable on z (so that z must be continuous).56
He shows that under these conditions, whenever the component demand function for good
one has the form b x1(p,z,w) = H(p1/h(z),p−1,w)/h(z), the pure repackaging preference re-
lation using this h function will be demand-consistent. However he does not show that pure
repackaging (as I have deﬁned it) must yield an b x1 component function of this form.57
Sometimes a quality change in a good primarily aﬀects preference through its eﬀect on
one or more other goods. Fisher and Shell use the example of quality change of refriger-
ators enhancing the enjoyment of ice-cream. This could be the case with any good that
primarily provides a functionality in support of other desired outcomes such as with most
transportation. Following Fisher and Shell (1971) equation (5.26), this may be represented
by the general seed relation form,
(x
a,z
a) %cpr (x
b,z
b) ⇔ U(x
a
1,f(x
a
1,x
a
2,z
a),x
a
3,...,x
a
L) ≥ U(x
b
1,f(x
b
1,x
b
2,z
b),x
b
3,...,x
b
L),
for all (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ b Y where z is again the quality of x1. Here the quantity of good one
can have a direct impact on preference, but the quality of that good only aﬀects preference
through the second good argument in the outside utility function U. Fisher and Shell
again oﬀer a more speciﬁc multiplicative form, f(x1,x2,z) = x2h(x1,z), while Willig (1978)
provides an additive form f(x1,x2,z) = x2 + x1h(z) and the terminology “cross-product
repackaging” (and hence the “cpr” of %cpr). Our analysis of repackaging can be also be
applied to the more complicated cross-product repackaging, to include parallels to equations
5 and 6 and Theorem A3.
Our modelling structure is intended to be quite general to accommodate a large variety
of applications. However, it may need to be modiﬁed for some applications, as with our last
example, the new and disappearing goods problem, an important issue in the construction
of price indices. Suppose that in going from one period to the next there are D disappearing
goods {x1d,x2d,...,xDd}, N new goods {x1n,x2n,...,xNn}, and the usual L goods that exist
in both periods. With D > 0 and N > 0 we have the problem of simultaneous new and
disappearing goods. On the other hand with either D = 0 or N = 0 we would respectively
have the new goods problem or the disappearing goods problem. With this application z
indexes the consumption set: initially with z = za, we have Xa = ℜ
L+D
+ with typical element
(x1,...,xL,x1d,...,xDd), and in the second period (z = zb) we have Xb = ℜ
L+N
+ with typical
element (x1,...,xL,x1n,...,xNn).
56With b X = ℜL
++ I have explicitly (and deliberately) not taken advantage of nonessentiality.
57Willig (1978) deﬁnes pure repackaging by this b x1 functional form.
24Even though this violates our assumption that the consumption set is invariant with z, the
modelling structure developed here is still applicable.58 In particular, this situation naturally
lends itself to an application of the neutral indiﬀerence seed relation with the reference set
XDN = ℜL
+ and typical element (x1,...,xL). XDN may be identiﬁed with the subset of Xa
where x1d = ... = xDd = 0, and also as the subset of Xb with x1n = ... = xNn = 0, so
that Xa
T
Xb = XDN. Suﬃciency of XDN requires that x1d,...,xDd are all simultaneously
nonessential in the ﬁrst period. That is, “any bundle including positive amounts of any the
goods x1d,...,xDd can be matched in the %za preference ordering by some other bundle which
excludes all of these goods.” In this same way, suﬃciency also requires that x1n,...,xNn are
all simultaneously nonessential in the second period.59
In this case, demand-consistency of the neutral indiﬀerence seed relation requires that %za
and %zb be identical on XDN (i.e., demand is single-preferenced on XDN). In implementing
the neutral seed relation we are assuming that none of the goods x1d,...,xDd,x1n,...,xNn
has any existence value. As with the previous discussion with respect to Theorems A1 and
A2, single-preference provides a one-way test of this assumption; it can be rejected but
cannot be aﬃrmed. With suﬃciency and b x-consistency, application of Theorem I1 part a
guarantees in this context a unique generated complete preference relation on b Y . Thus, any
obtainable consumption bundle in the ﬁrst period is fully comparable with any obtainable
consumption bundle in the second.
In this section I have shown how the previously developed structure based on reference
sets and seed relations can be applied with various API rationales. Some preference assump-
tions such as weak complementarity are most naturally stated as seed indiﬀerence relations.
For these applications we have Theorems I1, I2 and I3. However other API rationales such
as separable existence value and repackaging are best speciﬁed as seed preference relations,
for which we have Theorems P1, P2 and P3.
Our two core requirements for preference generation – a suﬃcient reference set and a
b x-consistent seed relation – provide the basis for examining the eﬃcacy of a given API.
Typically the most important consideration in this context is our ability to test the demand-
consistency of a given seed relation or seed relation form. In particular, with reference sets
that are not naturally ordered, b x-consistency requires additional conditions that we can
specify on the identiﬁable z-ﬁxed revealed preference relations {%z |z ∈ Z}. The original
API rationale can thus be tested against revealed preference.
With a speciﬁc seed relation, demand-consistency testing provides only a one-way test
of a rationale’s validity. For example, we can reject weak complementarity if demand is not
single-preferenced on XWC, but with single-preference we are not able to aﬃrm that the
“true” relation on b Y conforms with weak complementarity. On the other hand, with seed
forms such as %sx and %rp we typically lose uniqueness but it is sometimes possible to obtain
a two-way test of the seed form’s validity. For instance, we know that the “true” relation on
58Also, the simplifying assumption that b X is identical for all z ∈ Z is clearly not viable with this applica-
tion. However, none of our general results, such as the P and I theorems, depend on this assumption.
59With the pure new goods problem nonessentiality is trivially true for %za since consumption of any xid
is not possible. Similarly, nonessentiality is trivially true for %zb with the pure disappearing goods problem.
25b Y has separable existence value if and only if demand is single-preferenced on XWC.
With a complete redundant reference set, between the seed relation and revealed prefer-
ence information, there is a surplus of preference information so that the generated relation
on b Y is over-identiﬁed. This excess preference information may be used to either test the
seed relation against revealed preference, test an estimated demand function against the seed
relation, or reduce the overall preference information requirements. As was illustrated with
weak complementarity, that last option may be formally speciﬁed so that the seed relation
includes less information (by using a smaller reference set), but in practice may be inter-
preted as reducing the required amount of revealed preference information from the demand
function. This may have practical implications.
5 Conclusions
The problem addressed in this paper is the speciﬁcation of the missing preference information
in the context of state preference variables so that we can identify complete individual
demand-consistent relations on b Y , i.e., elements of Φ(b x). The key assumption underlying
this work is that a complete demand function is available from which we can obtain revealed
preference information for distinctions in commodity space. With Theorem 1 the signiﬁcance
of the problem becomes clear: without additional preference information, meaningful welfare
analysis involving diﬀerences in state preference variables is impossible.
The core results of this paper are contained in Theorems P1 and I1 which show how
elements of Φ(b x) can be uniquely identiﬁed by b x-consistent seed relations deﬁned with respect
to ﬁxed suﬃcient reference sets. Application of these theorems depends on knowing that a
given seed relation is indeed demand-consistent. With a general (reducible) reference set,
b x-consistency among seed relations can be very rare. However, from Theorems P2 and I2
we know that strongly monotone seed relations are always b x-consistent if (and only if) the
reference set is naturally ordered. This result is strengthened with Theorems P3 and I3 so
that when a reference set is not naturally ordered, there always exists a large class of demand
functions for which a gvien seed relation is not demand-consistent.
The structure developed here can be applied in at least three distinct ways. First, we
may customize both the reference set and seed relation to capture the intuition of a speciﬁc
assumed API such as with weak complementarity, repackaging or any of the other examples
of the preceding section. We can then know whether or not a given API is testable against
the revealed preference information. If it is testable, we can construct one-way tests of
speciﬁc seed relations such as weak complementarity and possibly two-way tests of seed
relation forms such as with separable existence value. In this context, Theorems P3 and I3
are critical tools in telling us when demand-consistency requires additional conditions that
can be veriﬁed with revealed preference. A more substantial summary of this approach is
presented in the last four paragraphs of the applications section.
A second way of applying this structure is to focus on alternative seed relations that
might be used with the same reference set. If a reference set is suﬃcient and non-redundant,
26then each seed relation deﬁned with respect to that set represents the minimal information
(preference or indiﬀerence) required to identify a unique demand-consistent relation on b Y .
We can compare all the members of Φ(b x) in complete detail by restricting our attention to
diﬀerences in the individual seed relations. This works particularly well when the reference
set is naturally ordered so that all monotonic seed relations are demand-consistent. Thus
Theorems P2 and I2 may be a critical tools for this type of application.60 Applications with
the ﬁrst approach, such as with ∼wc and %rp, focus on specifying and vetting potential API’s
that are based on speciﬁc rationales, whereas with this second approach we would typically
only work with seed relations that are known to be valid without necessarily considering
rationales. I approximated this second type of analysis with the characterization of Φ(b x) in
terms of separable versus nonseparable existence value (Theorem A2).
The structure developed here could also be applied in a third way whereby it is used to
provide a precise characterization of the minimal missing preference information that in turn
can be used to design behavioral experiments or surveys to elicit the missing information.
Such experiments and surveys would be designed to elicit a seed relation deﬁned with respect
to a speciﬁc non-redundant reference set. Alternatively, a redundant reference set may be
carefully designed to strategically verify the internal consistency of this non-market prefer-
ence data. An important distinction with this third type of application in comparison with
the ﬁrst type is that with experiments or surveys, API’s would actually represent real “ad-
ditional preference information” instead of mere supposition on the part of the investigators
(however thoughtful that supposition might be).
Focusing on the ﬁrst type of application, the system presented here is a general structure
that can be used with the many varied methodologies (API speciﬁcations) that have been
developed to deal with state preference variables in diverse areas such as the nonmarket
goods and price index literatures. It is thus a meta-system for examining and applying these
individual methodologies that brings to bear a level of precision and rigor for dealing with
issues such as whether a given methodology allows us to specify a complete preference rela-
tion on b Y , or whether the assumptions of another methodology are testable against revealed
preference. At present there is a lack of clarity in the literature concerning these issues.
For example, even thought weak complementarity is much discussed in the literature, it
does not seem to be well understood that a complete preference relation on b Y suﬃcient for
exact welfare analysis is fully determined by revealed preference information in the context
of nonessentiality and the no existence value assumption.61 There is also misunderstand-
ing in the literature concerning when assumptions such as weak complementarity can be
60With the ﬁrst approach Theorems P3 and I3 are important in telling us that not naturally ordered implies
instances of not demand-consistent, while with the second approach Theorems P2 and I2 are important
because they tells that naturally ordered implies demand-consistency.
61For example, Smith and Banzhaf (2004) perceive a need for an additional preference relation assumption
in the form of the “Willig conditions” (Willig, 1978) in order to facilitate exact welfare analysis. This
is discussed some in their footnote 11. However, with nonessentiality and no existence value, the state
preference relation is fully determined on b Y , thus enabling any of our standard exact measures such as
EV . Moreover, with a complete state preference relation, the Willig conditions are fully testable so that
introducing them as an assumption is questionable. This distinction does not seem to be a consequence of
my key assumption that all the z-ﬁxed relations {%z |z ∈ Z} are fully known.
27tested against revealed preference.62 Application of this structure in a systematic way with
these various methodologies may substantially increase our understanding of them, and thus
increase their eﬃcacy with real world applications.
All work to date known to this author with the various API’s discussed here is speciﬁcally
concerned with continuous state preference variables, where results are obtained by exploiting
diﬀerential and integral calculus conditions involving these variables in relation to price and
quantity.63 By comparison, the ﬁndings presented here are not restricted to continuous state
preference variables or other special conditions required for the application of calculus with
these variables.64 This generality is obtained by working instead directly with the logical
properties of preference such as transitivity, in conjunction with basic set theory. Given the
results obtained here which have escaped this calculus-based literature, it seems that methods
of real analysis are not only overly specialized for some applications, but by themselves are
also substantially incomplete as a general tool for understanding state preference variables
for purposes of welfare analysis.
Some potential API speciﬁcations are deﬁned in terms of the preference interaction be-
tween price and state preference variables. Examples may be found in Willig (1978) and
Ebert (2001). This is often the most natural way to state price indexing constructs. The
core concept of such a speciﬁcation is most naturally captured with a reference set deﬁned in
the realm of prices, PR ⊆ P, and a seed relation deﬁned on PR × Z. It is possible to extend
the structure presented here in terms of commodity preference to the realm of prices. That
development includes results which allow us to combine the power of preference generation
with commodities and prices respectively, so that we can identify unique elements of Φ(b x)
from seed relations deﬁned with respect to price reference sets.
Appendix: Proofs of Theorems
We begin with three lemmas. Lemma 1 is used in the proofs of Lemma 3 and Theorem 4,
Lemma 2 in that of Lemma 3 and Theorem 1, and Lemma 3 in the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. Let %Y be a preference relation on Y that yields the demand function b x, with
obtainable preference set b Y , and let z ∈ Z.
62For example, in the introduction of Ebert (2001), he states that “one is unable to reject” preference
assumptions such as weak complementarity with revealed preference. However, from the work presented
here we know that we can reject (but not aﬃrm) weak complementarity when L > 2. (Ebert (2001) is
presented in the realm of general L.) Ebert is suﬃciently aware of Theorem 1 (see Note 15) such that it
is impossible to aﬃrm a speciﬁc preference assumption such as weak complementarity using only revealed
preference information. However, it does not follow that we cannot reject a speciﬁc preference assumption
with only this information.
63Such as with Bradford and Hildebrandt (1977), Feenberg and Mills (1980), Fisher and Shell (1971),
M¨ aler (1971), M¨ aler (1974), Smith and Banzhaf (2004), and Willig (1978).
64My treatment of the new and disappearing goods problem is an example of this whereby z is explicitly
discrete with no continuous analog. Consequently, the usual diﬀerential deﬁnition of the neutral seed relation
such as with weak complementarity (see Note 33) cannot be applied here.
28a. Let xa ∈ X with (xa,z) ≻Y (0,z). Then (xa,z) ∼Y (xb,z) for some xb ∈ b X.
b. Let xa ∈ X with (0,z) %Y (xa,z). Then (xb,z) ≻Y (xa,z) for all xb ∈ b X.
Proof. a. Let xa ∈ X with (xa,z) ≻Y (0,z). If xa ∈ b X we would be done since trivially
(xa,z) ∼Y (xa,z). Suppose that xa / ∈ b X. For any p ∈ ℜL
++ let ˆ w = p   xa. Since xa is in the
budget set deﬁned by p and ˆ w, but xa  = b x(p,z, ˆ w), it must be that (b x(p,z, ˆ w),z) ≻Y (xa,z).
We have restricted the domain of our demand function to w > 0. However, a natural
extension to include w = 0 would give us b x(p,z,0) = 0 while still maintaining the continuity
of b x. We thus have (xa,z) ≻Y (b x(p,z,0),z). Then by the continuity of %Y and b x (in p and
w), there must be some ¯ w ∈ (0, ˆ w) such that where xb = b x(p,z, ¯ w) we have (xa,z) ∼Y (xb,z).
b. Let xa ∈ X with (0,z) %Y (xa,z) and let xb ∈ b X. We know that for some (p,w) ∈ ℜ
L+1
++ ,
b x(p,z,w) = xb. Then since 0 ∈ X is in the budget set deﬁned by (p,w), we have (xb,z) ≻Y
(0,z). Thus by the transitivity of ≻Y we have (xb,z) ≻Y (xa,z).
Lemma 2. Let u1 and u2 be two utility functions representing respectively the preference
relations, %1 and %2, on some generic preference domain Q, with ui : Q → ℜ, i = 1,2. Let
R ⊆ ℜ be the range of u1. Then %1=%2 if and only if there is some (strictly) increasing
monotonic transformation f : R → ℜ such that u2 = f(u1).
Proof. (⇐): Let f : R → ℜ be an increasing monotonic transformation such that f(u1) = u2.
Let qa,qb ∈ Q. Then, u1(qa) ≥ u1(qb) ⇔ f (u1(qa)) ≥ f
￿
u1(qb)
￿
⇔ u2(qa) ≥ u2(qb). Thus,
u1 and u2 represent the same preference relation.
(⇒): Deﬁne the utility value sets Ui = {v ∈ ℜ|v = ui(q) for some q ∈ Q}, for i = 1,2. Then
with the common preference relation %Q≡%1=%2, the preference set Q can be partitioned
into indiﬀerence sets such that if I ⊆ Q is such an indiﬀerence set, then q1,q2 ∈ I ⇒ q1 ∼Q q2,
and if q1,q2 ∈ Q and q1 ∼Q q2 then q1 and q2 are elements of the same indiﬀerence set. The
set of such indiﬀerence sets is I = {I ⊆ Q|I is indiﬀerence set with respect to %Q}.
For i = 1,2, there is a one-to-one relationship, fi, between the elements of I and Ui such
that for I ∈ I and vi ∈ Ui, then I = fi(vi) if and only if vi = ui(q) for all q ∈ I. With these
we can construct a one-to-one relationship, f, between the elements of U1 and U2 such that
for vi ∈ Ui, i = 1,2, v2 = f(v1) if and only if f1(v1) = f2(v2). Moreover, where f
−1
2 is the
inverse function of f2, we have v2 = f
−1
2 (f1(v1)), so that f = f
−1
2 ◦ f1.
Let q ∈ Q. Then there is some I ∈ I, v1 ∈ U1 and v2 ∈ U2, such that q ∈ I, u1(q) = v1
and u2(q) = v2, with f1(v1) = f2(v2) = I. It then follows that u2(q) = f (u1(q)), so that
u2 = f ◦ u1, often written as u2 = f(u1).
Let va
1,vb
1 ∈ U1 such that va
1 > vb
1. Then there is some qa,qb ∈ Q such that u1(qa) = va
1,
u1(qb) = vb
1 and qa %Q qb. Then where u2(qa) = va
2 and u2(qb) = vb
2, it must be that
va
2 > vb
2. Thus since f(va
1) = va
2 and f(vb
1) = vb
2, we have f(va
1) > f(vb
1), showing that f is a
monotonically increasing transformation. The domain of f and f1 is U1 = R.
Lemma 3. Let u1 and u2 be two utility functions representing preferences on X with respec-
29tive demand functions b x1 and b x2 obtained from solving the optimization program,
Program UX: max
x
u(x)
s.t. p   x ≤ w,
x ∈ X,
so that they have the same obtainable set b X = {x ∈ X |x = b xi(p,w) for some (p,w) ∈
ℜ
L+1
++ }, i = 1,2. Then b x1 = b x2 if and only if there is some monotonic transformation
f : R → ℜ such that u2(x) = f (u1(x)) for all x ∈ b X (where R is the range of u1).
Proof. (⇐): Let there be some monotonic transformation f : R → ℜ such that u2(x) =
f (u1(x)) for all x ∈ b X. Then for any (pa,wa) ∈ ℜ
L+1
++ with xa = b x1(pa,wa), we need to
show that xa = b x2(pa,wa). We know that b x2(pa,wa) ∈ b X. Let xb  = xa be any other feasible
solution (xb ∈ b X with paxb ≤ wa). Then u1(xb) < u1(xa) ⇒ f(u1(xb)) < f(u1(xa)) ⇒
u2(xb) < u2(xa). Thus xb  = b x2(pa,wa) so that xa = b x2(pa,wa), and hence b x1 = b x2.
(⇒): Let b x1 = b x2. Deﬁne the utility functions b u1 and b u2 to be the respective restrictions of
u1 and u2 to b X: b ui(x) = ui(x), i = 1,2 for all x ∈ b X.
For each i = 1,2: Denote the range of ui as ℜi, the range of b ui as b ℜi ⊆ ℜi, and deﬁne
v0
i = ui(0). Then from Lemma 1 part a, for any vi ∈ ℜi with vi > v0
i there is some xi ∈ b X
such that ui(xi) = vi and hence vi ∈ b ℜi. From Lemma 1 part b, for any vi ∈ ℜi such that
vi ≤ v0
i, there is no xi ∈ b X such that ui(xi) = vi. Thus b ℜi = (v0
i,∞)
T
ℜi. (For these
applications of Lemma 1, Z is a singleton so that preference on Y is equivalent to preference
on X.)
By an assumption stated in the text of the paper, b u1 and b u2 represent the same pref-
erence relation on b X, and hence by Lemma 2 there is some (strictly) increasing monotonic
transformation h : b ℜ1 → ℜ such that b u2 = h(b u1), or b u2(x) = h(b u1(x)) for all x ∈ b X. Finally
we can deﬁne the monotonic transformation f : ℜ1 → ℜ, by f(v) = h(v) if v ∈ b ℜ1, and
f(v) = v + v0
2 − v0
1 otherwise, so that u2(x) = f (u1(x)) for all x ∈ b X.
Theorem 1
Proof. Let u1 and u2 be two utility functions representing preferences on Y .
a. Then for each i ∈ {1,2} and z ∈ Z, we have a utility function on X, uiz, such that
uiz(x) = ui(x,z). u1 and u2 will yield the same demand function b x(p,z,w) with Program
UY if and only if for all z ∈ Z, u1z and u2z yield the same demand function b xz(p,w) with
Program UX of Lemma 3, where b x(p,z,w) = b xz(p,w).
From Lemma 3, for each z ∈ Z, u1z and u2z yield the same demand function b xz(p,w) with
Program UX if and only if there is some increasing monotonic transformation fz : ℜu → ℜ
such that u2z(x) = fz (u1z(x)) for all x ∈ b X.
When all the fz exist we can deﬁne g : ℜu × Z → ℜ by g(u,z) = fz(u). Since each fz
is increasing monotonic, it follows that g is strictly increasing in u. Also, if start with a
g-transform, then we can similarly deﬁne a complete set of fz transformations. Thus, having
such a g-transform is equivalent to having all the fz-transforms.
30Therefore, from the three previous paragraphs, u1 and u2 will yield the same demand
function b x(p,z,w) with Program UY if and only if there is some transformation g : ℜu×Z →
ℜ such that u2(x,z) = g (u1(x,z),z) for all (x,z) ∈ b Y , with g increasing in u.
b. Let g be a g-transform such that u2 = g (u1,z). From Lemma 2, u1 and u2 represent the
same preference relation on b Y if and only if there is some (strictly) increasing monotonic
transformation f : ℜu → ℜ such that u2(x,z) = f(u1(x,z)) for all (x,z) ∈ b Y . But we also
have u2(x,z) = g (u1(x,z),z), and hence g (u1(x,z),z) = f(u1(x,z)) for all (x,z) ∈ b Y . Thus
g(u,z) = f(u) for all u ∈ b ℜ1, where b ℜ1 is the range of u1 when restricted to the domain b Y ,
b ℜ1 = {u ∈ ℜu |u = u1(x,z) for some (x,z) ∈ b Y }.
The following lemma, showing that each %z is strongly monotone is used in the proofs
of Theorems 2 and P2.
Lemma 4. For each z ∈ Z, the preference relation %z is strongly monotone: if x0,x1 ∈ b X,
with x1 ≥ x0 (x1
ℓ ≥ x0
ℓ for all ℓ = 1,...,L) and x1  = x0, then x1 ≻z x0.
Proof. Let z ∈ Z, x0 ∈ X and x1 ∈ b X, with x1 ≥ x0 (x1
ℓ ≥ x0
ℓ for all ℓ = 1,...,L) and
x1  = x0. Then for some p1 ∈ ℜL
+, b x(p1,z,1) = x1 and hence p1   x1 = 1. Then x1 ≥ x0
implies that p1   x0 ≤ 1 so that bundle x0 is aﬀordable when x1 is chosen. Since x0 is not
chosen, it must be that x1 ≻z x0.
Theorem 2
Proof. Let XR ⊆ X be a naturally ordered reference set, and for any possible Z let b x :
ℜL
++ × Z × ℜ++ → ℜL be a feasible demand function. Now suppose that XR is redundant
so that for some (x,z) ∈ b Y , there are x1
R,x2
R ∈ XR with x1
R  = x2
R such that x ∼z x1
R and
x ∼z x2
R. Then we also have x1
R ∼z x2
R with both x1
R,x2
R ∈ b X. Applying Lemma 4 we know
that %z is strongly monotone. Then x1
R ∼z x2
R precludes the possibility of either x1
R ≤ x2
R or
x2
R ≤ x1
R, and hence XR cannot be naturally ordered. Thus by contradiction, XR must be
non-redundant.
Theorem 3
Proof. Let XR ⊆ X be a reference set that is not naturally ordered, so that for some
x1,x2 ∈ XR with x1  = x2 we have neither x1 ≤ x2 nor x2 ≤ x1. Then for some integers
k and ℓ with 1 ≤ k ≤ L and 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ L, we have x1
k < x2
k and x1
ℓ > x2
ℓ. Deﬁne α =
(x2
k − x1
k)
.￿p
x1
ℓ −
p
x2
ℓ
￿
. With the singleton set of feasible state preference variable values,
e Z = {e z}, we deﬁne the z-ﬁxed preference relation xa %e z xb ⇔ u(xa) ≥ u(xb) where u(x) is
the quasilinear utility function u(x) = xk + α
√
xℓ. Then %e z is strictly convex and strongly
monotone over ℜL
+ such that ℜL
++ ⊂ b Xe z ⊂ ℜL
+. The utility function was constructed so that
u(x1) = u(x2) and hence XR is redundant with respect to the demand function obtained
with %e z. Thus a reference set that is not naturally ordered cannot be universally non-
redundant.
31Theorem 4
Proof. Let XR ⊆ X such that XR is naturally ordered and suﬃcient. For any ﬁxed z ∈ Z,
let %z be a strongly monotone preference relation on X such that the identiﬁable preference
relation %z is the restriction of %z to b X.
Let x1 ∈ XR\{0}. Then x1 ≻z 0, and hence by Lemma 1 part a, there exists some x2 ∈ b X
such that x1 ∼z x2. From suﬃciency, there also must be some x3 ∈ XR so that x2 ∼z x3 and
hence x3 ∈ b X. Assume that x1  = x3. Since XR is naturally ordered, we must have either
x1 ≥ x3 or x3 ≥ x1 (but not both). Then from the strong monotonicity of %z, we have either
x1 ≻z x3 or x3 ≻z x1, but not x1 ∼z x3. Thus by contradiction x1 = x3, and hence x1 ∈ b X.
We have demonstrated that XR\{0} ⊆ b X.
Theorem P1
Proof. For the demand function b x : ℜL
++ × Z × ℜ++ → ℜL with identiﬁable {%z |z ∈ Z}
and obtainable set b X, let XR be a suﬃcient reference set relative to b x.
Part a:
Let %s be a complete and transitive preference relation on b YR = (XR×Z)
T b Y , such that
for any z ∈ Z and xa,xb ∈ XR
T b X, (xa,z) %s (xb,z) ⇔ xa %z xb (i.e., %s is b x-consistent).
Let (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ b Y . Then by the properties of a complete reference set we know
that there are some xa
R,xb
R ∈ XR such that xa ∼za xa
R and xb ∼zb xb
R, and we can deﬁne the
relation %S on b Y such that (xa,za) %S (xb,zb) if and only if (xa
R,za) %s (xb
R,zb). It follows
from this construction that %S is complete on b Y .
Suppose that we also had ˜ xa
R, ˜ xb
R ∈ XR such that xa ∼za ˜ xa
R and xb ∼zb ˜ xb
R, allowing us
to deﬁne the alternative preference relation %T on b Y such that (xa,za) %T (xb,zb) if and
only if (˜ xa
R,za) %s (˜ xb
R,zb). Since %za and %zb are both transitive, we have xa
R ∼za ˜ xa
R and
xb
R ∼zb ˜ xb
R, so that by the consistency property of %s we know that (xa
R,za) ∼s (˜ xa
R,za)
and (xb
R,zb) ∼s (˜ xb
R,zb). Then (xa
R,za) %s (xb
R,zb) ⇔ (˜ xa
R,za) %s (˜ xb
R,zb), and hence
(xa,za) %S (xb,zb) if and only if (xa,za) %T (xb,zb). Thus given the seed relation %s, the
generated relation %S is well deﬁned.
We still need to show that %S is transitive; completely consistent with %s on b YR and
with all %z as they are respectively deﬁned on b X; and unique.
Let (xa,za),(xb,zb),(xc,zc) ∈ b Y such that (xa,za) %S (xb,zb) and (xb,zb) %S (xc,zc).
Then let xa
R,xb
R,xc
R ∈ XR such that xa ∼za xa
R, xb ∼zb xb
R and xc ∼zc xc
R, so that (xa
R,za) %s
(xb
R,zb) and (xb
R,zb) %s (xc
R,zc). By the transitivity of %s, we then have (xa
R,za) %s (xc
R,zc),
and hence (xa,za) %S (xb,zb) so that %S is transitive.
For any (xa
R,za),(xb
R,zb) ∈ b YR we have (xa
R,za) %S (xb
R,zb) ⇔ (xa
R,za) %s (xb
R,zb), so
that %S completely consistent with %s.
For any z ∈ Z, let (xa,z),(xb,z) ∈ b Y and assume that (xa,z) %S (xb,z). Then for some
xa
R,xb
R ∈ XR such that xa ∼z xa
R and xb ∼z xb
R, we have (xa
R,z) %s (xb
R,z), and hence
xa %z xb. Now working in the other direction, assume that xa %z xb for some z ∈ Z. Then
32there are some xa
R,xb
R ∈ XR such that xa ∼z xa
R and xb ∼z xb
R, giving us xa
R %z xb
R and
(xa
R,z) %s (xb
R,z), and hence (xa,z) %S (xb,z). Thus for any z ∈ Z, %S ≡%z when restricted
to b X with za = zb = z, and hence %S is b x-consistent.
Let %T be any complete and transitive preference relation deﬁned on b Y that is completely
consistent with %s and all %z for z ∈ Z. Let (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ b Y . Then there is some
xa
R,xb
R ∈ XR such that xa ∼za xa
R, xb ∼zb xb
R, and (xa,za) %S (xb,zb) ⇔ (xa
R,za) %s
(xb
R,zb). Then we have (xa,za) ∼T (xa
R,za), (xb,zb) ∼T (xb
R,zb) and (xa
R,za) %s (xb
R,zb) ⇔
(xa
R,za) %T (xb
R,zb), so that be the transitivity of %T, (xa
R,za) %s (xb
R,zb) ⇔ (xa,za) %T
(xb,zb). Thus %T ≡%S, and hence %S is unique.
Part b:
Let %S be a complete and transitive preference relation on b Y , such that for any z ∈ Z and
any xa,xb ∈ b X, (xa,z) %S (xb,z) ⇔ xa %z xb (i.e., %S is b x-consistent). Now deﬁne %s as the
restriction of %S to b YR = (XR × Z)
T b Y : for any (xa
R,za),(xb
R,zb) ∈ b YR, (xa
R,za) %s (xb
R,zb)
if and only if (xa
R,za) %S (xb
R,zb). The completeness and b x-consistency of %S implies the
completeness and b x-consistency of %s (with completeness now deﬁned on a smaller preference
domain). By part a just proven, there is a unique complete and transitive preference relation
on b Y that is consistent with %s and with %z for all z ∈ Z. Clearly that preference relation
on b Y must be %S.
It remains to show that %s is unique. Let %t be any complete and transitive preference
relation on b YR that is consistent with %S. Then for any (xa
R,za),(xb
R,zb) ∈ b YR, (xa
R,za) %t
(xb
R,zb) ⇔ (xa
R,za) %S (xb
R,zb), so that (xa
R,za) %t (xb
R,zb) ⇔ (xa
R,za) %s (xb
R,zb). Thus
%t ≡%s, and hence %s is unique.
Theorem P2
Proof. For the demand function b x : ℜL
++×Z×ℜ++ → ℜL with identiﬁable z-ﬁxed preference
relations {%z |z ∈ Z} and obtainable set b X, let XR be a reference set.
a. Let XR be a reference set such that XR
T b X is naturally ordered, and let %s be a strongly
monotone seed preference relation on b YR = (XR × Z)
T b Y . Now consider any z ∈ Z and
xa,xb ∈ XR
T b X. We need to show that (xa,z) %s (xb,z) ⇔ xa %z xb.
Since XR
T b X is naturally ordered and %s is strongly monotone, we have either xa ≥ xb
with (xa,z) %s (xb,z), or xb ≥ xa and xb  = xa with (xb,z) ≻s (xa,z). Applying Lemma 4
we have %z strongly monotone, and hence either xa ≥ xb ⇒ xa %z xb, or [xb ≥ xa and xb  =
xa] ⇒ xb ≻z xa. Thus (xa,z) %s (xb,z) ⇔ xa %z xb, so that %s is b x-consistent.
b. Let all strongly monotone seed preference relation on b YR = (XR×Z)
T b Y be b x-consistent.
Suppose that XR
T b X is not naturally ordered. Then for some x1,x2 ∈ XR
T b X we have
neither x1 ≥ x2 nor x2 ≥ x1, so that for some integers k and ℓ with 1 ≤ k ≤ L and 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ L,
we have x1
k < x2
k and x1
ℓ > x2
ℓ. Without loss of generality we may assume that x1 %z0 x2 for
some z0 ∈ Z. For any ﬁxed α, 0 < α < x2
k − x1
k, deﬁne β = (x2
k − x1
k − α)
.￿p
x1
ℓ −
p
x2
ℓ
￿
.
We now consider the strongly monotone seed preference relation %s deﬁned on b YR such that
(xa,za) %s (xb,zb) if and only if u(xa) ≥ u(xb) where u(x) is the quasilinear utility function
33u(x) = xk + β
√
xℓ. This utility function was constructed so that u(x1) < u(x2), and hence
%s is not consistent with b x. Thus by contradiction, XR
T b X is naturally ordered. Note that
with the range of possible α values, we have an inﬁnite number of preference seed relations
that are not demand-consistent if XR
T b X is not naturally ordered.
Theorem P3
Proof. Let XR be a reference set that is not naturally ordered and let %s be a strongly
monotone seed preference relation deﬁned on on YR = XR ×Z. We need to show that %s is
not demand-consistent for an inﬁnite number of valid demand functions.
Let b x : ℜL
++ × Z × ℜ++ → ℜL be a valid demand function with identiﬁable z-ﬁxed
preference relations {%z |z ∈ Z} and obtainable set b X. Let z0 ∈ Z. Since XR is not
naturally ordered, for some x1,x2 ∈ XR we have neither x1 ≥ x2 nor x2 ≥ x1, so that for
some integers k and ℓ with 1 ≤ k ≤ L and 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ L, we have x1
k < x2
k and x1
ℓ > x2
ℓ. Without
loss of generality we may assume that (x1,z0) %s (x2,z0). For any ﬁxed α, 0 < α < x2
k −x1
k,
deﬁne β = (x2
k − x1
k − α)
.￿p
x1
ℓ −
p
x2
ℓ
￿
. We now consider the new strongly monotone
z-ﬁxed preference relation ˙ %z0 deﬁned on X such that xa ˙ %z0xb if and only if u(xa) ≥ u(xb)
where u(x) is the quasilinear utility function u(x) = xk + β
√
xℓ. This utility function was
constructed so that u(x1) < u(x2), and hence ˙ %z0 is not consistent with %s. We now deﬁne
a new demand function via equation (2) with the previous z-ﬁxed relations {%z |z ∈ Z},
except that %z0 is replaced by ˙ %z0. With the range of possible α values, we have an inﬁnite
number of such demand functions for which %s is not demand-consistent.
The following lemma, establishing a connection between b x-consistent preference and in-
diﬀerence relations, is used in the proofs of the subsequent three theorems.
Lemma 5. Given the demand function b x with obtainable set b Y with subset e Y ⊆ b Y :
a. Let % be a b x-consistent preference relation on e Y . Then any indiﬀerence relation that is
consistent with % is b x-consistent. Furthermore, the (unique) associated indiﬀerence relation
of % also satisﬁes condition 1′.
b. Let ∼ be a uniﬁed b x-consistent indiﬀerence relation on e Y . Then there is a unique b x-
consistent transitive complete preference relation on e Y that is consistent with ∼. With ∼
also satisfying condition 1′, it is the unique indiﬀerence relation associated with the preference
relation.65
Proof. For the demand function b x : ℜL
++×Z×ℜ++ → ℜL with identiﬁable z-ﬁxed preference
relations {%z |z ∈ Z} and obtainable set b Y , let e Y ⊆ b Y .
a. Let % be a b x-consistent preference relation on e Y and let ∼ be any indiﬀerence relation on
e Y that is consistent with %, so that (xa,za) ∼ (xb,zb) ⇒ [(xa,za) % (xb,zb) and (xb,zb) %
65Without the uniﬁed property in part b, there could be either multiple, one, or even no b x-consistent
transitive complete preference relations that are consistent with the given demand-consistent indiﬀerence
relation (even with condition 1′).
34(xa,za)] for all (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ e Y . We need to show that ∼ is: 1) b x-consistent; and 2)
satisﬁes condition 1′ if it is also the (unique) associated indiﬀerence relation of %.
Let (xa,z),(xb,z) ∈ e Y with z ∈ Z. Then we have (xa,z) ∼ (xb,z) ⇒ [(xa,z) %
(xb,z) and (xb,z) % (xa,z)] ⇒ [xa %z xb and xb %z xa] ⇒ xa ∼z xb, so that ∼ satisﬁes
the ﬁrst property of b x-consistent indiﬀerence relations.
Let (x1,za),(x2,zb),(x3,za),(x4,zb) ∈ e Y and za,zb ∈ Z such that (x1,za) ∼ (x2,zb)
and (x3,za) ∼ (x4,zb). Then by deﬁnition we have (x1,za) % (x2,zb), (x2,zb) % (x1,za),
(x3,za) % (x4,zb) and (x4,zb) % (x3,za). If (x1,za) % (x3,za), then by transitivity we
would also have (x2,zb) % (x4,zb). Similarly, (x2,zb) % (x4,zb) ⇒ (x1,za) % (x3,za), and
hence (x1,za) % (x3,za) ⇔ (x2,zb) % (x4,zb). Since % is b x-consistent, we have x1 %za
x3 ⇔ (x1,za) % (x3,za) and x2 %zb x4 ⇔ (x2,zb) % (x4,zb). Then applying the three
“⇔” relationships, we obtain x1 %za x3 ⇔ x2 %zb x4, and hence ∼ also satisﬁes the second
property of b x-consistent indiﬀerence relations.
Now suppose that ∼ is also the (unique) associated indiﬀerence relation of % so that
(xa,za) ∼ (xb,zb) ⇔ [(xa,za) % (xb,zb) and (xb,zb) % (xa,za)] for all (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈
e Y . Then for any (xa,z),(xb,z) ∈ e Y with z ∈ Z, we have (xa,z) ∼ (xb,z) ⇔ [(xa,z) %
(xb,z) and (xb,z) % (xa,z)] ⇔ [xa %z xb and xb %z xa] ⇔ xa ∼z xb, so that condition 1′ is
satisﬁed.
b. Let ∼ be a uniﬁed b x-consistent indiﬀerence relation on e Y . We will construct a unique well
deﬁned b x-consistent transitive complete preference relation on e Y that is consistent with ∼.
When ∼ also satisﬁes condition 1′, we must show that it is the unique indiﬀerence relation
associated with the constructed preference relation.
Let (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ e Y . Since ∼ is uniﬁed, there are some (xA,zb),(xB,za) ∈ e Y such
that (xa,za) ∼ (xA,zb) and (xb,zb) ∼ (xB,za). Then from the second b x-consistency property
of ∼ we know that xa %za xB if and only if xA %zb xb. We deﬁne a preference relation %i
on e Y such that (xa,za) %i (xb,zb) if and only if these two equivalent conditions are true. As
constructed %i is complete on e Y , but perhaps not well deﬁned since it may depend on the
selection of xA and xB.
Suppose that we also had (˜ xA,zb),(˜ xB,za) ∈ e Y such that (xa,za) ∼ (˜ xA,zb) and (xb,zb) ∼
(˜ xB,za), allowing us to deﬁne the alternative preference relation %j on e Y such that (xa,za) %j
(xb,zb) if and only if xa %za ˜ xB, and equivalently if and only if ˜ xA %zb xb. Then (xA,zb) ∼
(˜ xA,zb) and (xB,za) ∼ (˜ xB,za), so that by the ﬁrst b x-consistency property of ∼ we know that
xA ∼zb ˜ xA and xB ∼za ˜ xB. Thus by the transitive properties of %za and %zb we respectively
have xa %za xB ⇔ xa %za ˜ xB and ˜ xA %zb xb ⇔ xA %zb xb, and hence (xa,za) %i (xb,zb) ⇔
(xa,za) %j (xb,zb). This shows that the selection of xA and xB has no eﬀect on the deﬁnition
of %i, and hence this preference relation is well deﬁned.
Let (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ e Y with (xa,za) ∼ (xb,zb). By deﬁning xB = xa (for the con-
struction of %i) we have both (xb,zb) ∼ (xB,za) and (xa,za) ∼ (xB,za). Then from the
ﬁrst b x-consistency property of ∼ we get xa %za xB and xB %za xa, so that by deﬁni-
tion, (xa,za) %i (xb,zb) and (xb,zb) %i (xa,za). Thus (xa,za) ∼ (xb,zb) ⇒ [(xa,za) %i
(xb,zb) and (xb,zb) %i (xa,za)] and hence %i is consistent with ∼.
35For this paragraph only, let ∼ also satisfy condition 1′ and assume that for some (xa,za),
(xb,zb) ∈ e Y we have (xa,za) %i (xb,zb) and (xb,zb) %i (xa,za). Then by deﬁnition there
is some (xA,zb) ∈ e Y such that (xa,za) ∼ (xA,zb), xA %zb xb and xb %zb xA, so that
xA ∼zb xb. From condition 1′ we then have (xA,zb) ∼ (xb,zb), and hence by transitivity of
∼, (xa,za) ∼ (xb,zb). Combining this with the results of the previous paragraph, we have
(xa,za) ∼ (xb,zb) ⇔ [(xa,za) %i (xb,zb) and (xb,zb) %i (xa,za)], so that ∼ is the unique
indiﬀerence relation associated with %i.
Let (xa,za),(xb,zb),(xc,zc) ∈ e Y such that (xa,za) %i (xb,zb) and (xb,zb) %i (xc,zc).
Then there are some (xAb,zb),(xCb,zb) ∈ e Y such that (xa,za) ∼ (xAb,zb), (xCb,zb) ∼ (xc,zc),
xAb %zb xb and xb %zb xCb. By the transitivity of %zb we have xAb %zb xCb. Since ∼ is uniﬁed
there exists some (xCa,za) ∈ e Y such that (xCa,za) ∼ (xc,zc), and by the transitivity of
∼ then have (xCa,za) ∼ (xCb,zb). Combining this result with (xa,za) ∼ (xAb,zb) and
xAb %zb xCb, the second b x-consistency property of ∼ gives us xa %za xCa. Thus by deﬁnition
(xa,za) %i (xc,zc), demonstrating that %i is transitive.
For any z ∈ Z, let (xa,z),(xb,z) ∈ e Y . Then applying our deﬁnition of %i with xb = xB
and z = za = zb, we have (xa,z) %i (xb,z) ⇔ xa %z xb. Thus %i is b x-consistent.
Suppose that %k is an b x-consistent complete and transitive preference relation deﬁned on
e Y that is consistent with ∼, and for some (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ e Y let (xa,za) %i (xb,zb). By the
deﬁnition of %i we have some (xA,zb) ∈ e Y such that (xa,za) ∼ (xA,zb) and xA %zb xb. Since
%k is consistent with ∼ we have (xa,za) %k (xA,zb), and since %k is b x-consistent also have
(xA,zb) %k (xb,zb). Then by transitivity, (xa,za) %k (xb,zb) and hence %k=%i. Thus %i is
the unique b x-consistent complete and transitive preference relation deﬁned on e Y consistent
with ∼.
Theorem I1
Proof. For the demand function b x : ℜL
++×Z×ℜ++ → ℜL with identiﬁable z-ﬁxed preference
relations {%z |z ∈ Z} and obtainable set b X, let XR be a suﬃcient reference set relative to
b x and deﬁne b YR = (XR × Z)
T b Y .
a. Let ∼s be a uniﬁed b x-consistent indiﬀerence relation deﬁned on b YR. From part b of Lemma
5, there is a unique b x-consistent transitive complete preference relation on b YR consistent with
∼s denoted by %s. Then from part a of Theorem P1, there is a unique complete and transitive
b x-consistent generated preference relation on b Y that is completely consistent with %s on b YR,
denoted by %S.
We need to show that %S is consistent with ∼s, unique and uniﬁed. For any (xa
R,za),
(xb
R,zb) ∈ (XR×Z)
T b Y we have, (xa
R,za) ∼s (xb
R,zb) ⇒
￿
(xa
R,za) %s (xb
R,zb) and (xb
R,zb) %s
(xa
R,za)] ⇒
￿
(xa
R,za) %S (xb
R,zb) and (xb
R,zb) %S (xa
R,za)
￿
, so that %S is consistent with ∼s.
Let %T be a complete and transitive b x-consistent preference relation deﬁned on b Y that is
consistent with ∼s such that %T =%S. Where %t is the restriction of %T to b YR, %t must be
consistent with ∼s. From the unique relationship between %s and %S we know that %t =%s.
Then from the unique relationship between %s and ∼s we know that %t cannot have all the
36properties of b x-consistency, ∼s-consistency, transitivity and completeness. Hence %T also
cannot have all three properties. Thus by contradiction %S is unique.
Let ∼S be the (unique) indiﬀerence relation associated with %S and let za,zb ∈ Z with
xa ∈ b X. Since XR is suﬃcient there is some xa
R ∈ XR such that xa ∼za xa
R and hence
(xa,za) ∼S (xa
R,za). Since ∼s is uniﬁed, there is some xb
R ∈ XR such that (xa
R,za) ∼s (xb
R,zb)
and therefore (xa
R,za) ∼S (xb
R,zb). We then have (xa,za) ∼S (xb
R,zb) so that %S is uniﬁed.
b. Let %S be a complete, transitive and uniﬁed b x-consistent preference relation on b Y . From
part b of Theorem P1, %S is generated by (and hence consistent with) a unique b x-consistent
seed preference relation on b YR, denoted by %s. From the proof of that Theorem we also know
that %s is the restriction of %S to b YR. Let ∼s be the unique indiﬀerence relation associated
with %s. From part a of Lemma 5 we know ∼s is e x-consistent and satisﬁes condition 1′. We
need to show that ∼s is uniﬁed and unique.
Let za,zb ∈ Z and xa
R ∈ XR such that (xa
R,za) ∈ b YR. To show that ∼s is uniﬁed
we need to demonstrate that there is also some xb
R ∈ XR such that (xb
R,zb) ∈ b YR and
(xa
R,za) ∼s (xb
R,zb). Since %S is uniﬁed, we do know that there is some xb ∈ b X such that
(xa
R,za) ∼S (xb,zb). Since XR is suﬃcient, there is some xb
R ∈ XR such that xb
R ∼zb xb, and
hence by the b x-consistency of %S, (xb
R,zb) ∼S (xb,zb). Then by the transitivity of %S we
have (xa
R,za) ∼S (xb
R,zb) and hence (xa
R,za) ∼s (xb
R,zb). We also have xb
R ∈ b X and therefore
(xb
R,zb) ∈ b YR. Thus ∼s is uniﬁed.
Let ∼k be any uniﬁed b x-consistent indiﬀerence relation deﬁned on b YR that satisﬁes condi-
tion 1′ and is consistent with %S. Then from Lemma 5 part b, there is a unique b x-consistent
preference relation deﬁned on b YR that is consistent with ∼k. This preference relation is
clearly %s. Also from Lemma 5 part b, ∼k is the unique indiﬀerence relation associated with
%s. However ∼s is also associated with %s. Therefore ∼k=∼s and ∼s is unique.
Let ∼t be a uniﬁed b x-consistent seed indiﬀerence relation on b YR. Suppose that %S
can generated by ∼t. Then for any (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ b YR, we have (xa,za) ∼t (xb,zb) ⇒
(xa,za) ∼S (xb,zb) ⇒ (xa,za) ∼s (xb,zb). Now instead suppose that (xa,za) ∼t (xb,zb) ⇒
(xa,za) ∼s (xb,zb) for any (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ b YR. Then since all the indiﬀerence infor-
mation of ∼t is included in ∼s, they must generate the same unique element of Φ(b x) as
described by part a of this theorem, so that %S can be generated by ∼t. We have shown
that %S can generated by ∼t if and only if (xa,za) ∼t (xb,zb) ⇒ (xa,za) ∼s (xb,zb) for any
(xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ b YR.
Theorem I2
Proof. Given the demand function b x with obtainable set b X:
a. Let XR be a reference set such that XR
T b X is naturally ordered, and let ∼s be a strongly
monotone seed indiﬀerence relation on b YR = (XR × Z)
T b Y . By deﬁnition ∼s is consistent
with a strongly monotone preference relation on b YR, denoted %s. Then by part a of Theorem
P2, %s is b x-consistent, so that by part a of Lemma 5, ∼s is also b x-consistent.
Let xa,xb ∈ XR
T b X and z ∈ Z so that (xa,z),(xb,z) ∈ b YR. From b x-consistency of ∼s we
have (xa,z) ∼s (xb,z) ⇒ xa ∼z xb. Suppose that xa ∼z xb. Then since XR is non-redundant
37(Theorem 2), we must have xa = xb, so that trivially (xa,z) ∼s (xb,z). We have shown that
(xa,z) ∼s (xb,z) ⇔ xa ∼z xb and hence ∼s satisﬁes condition 1′ for indiﬀerence relation
demand-consistency.
b. Let XR be a reference set such that any strongly monotone uniﬁed seed indiﬀerence
relation on b YR = (XR × Z)
T b Y is b x-consistent. Then any strongly monotone preference
relation on b YR must be consistent with at least one of these indiﬀerence relations (in particular
with its unique associated indiﬀerence relation), and hence by part b of Lemma 5 is also
b x-consistent. Thus by part b of Theorem P2, XR
T b X is naturally ordered.
Theorem I3
Proof. Let XR be a reference set that is not naturally ordered and deﬁne YR = XR ×Z, and
let ∼s be a uniﬁed seed preference relation deﬁned on on YR.
Since XR is not naturally ordered, for some x1,x2 ∈ XR we have neither x1 ≥ x2 nor
x2 ≥ x1, so that for some integers k and ℓ with 1 ≤ k ≤ L and 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ L, we have
x1
k < x2
k and x1
ℓ > x2
ℓ. Let za,zb ∈ Z with za  = zb. Then since ∼s is uniﬁed, there exists
some x1b,x2b ∈ XR such that (x1,za) ∼s (x1b,zb) and (x2,za) ∼s (x2b,zb). The second
condition for demand-consistent indiﬀerence relations requires x1 %za x2 ⇔ x1b %zb x2b (and
x2 %za x1 ⇔ x2b %zb x1b). With each of the following four cases we obtain violations of this
condition.
First, suppose that x1b = x2b. Then ∼s is not demand-consistent for any demand function
with an identiﬁable preference relation %za such that either x1 ≻za x2 or x2 ≻za x1. Clearly
there are inﬁnitely many such demand functions for both outcomes. For each of the remaining
three cases we have x1b  = x2b. With the second case we also have x1b ≥ x2b. Then ∼s
is demand-inconsistent whenever x2 ≻za x1. Similarly with x1b ≤ x2b, we have demand-
inconsistency whenever x1 ≻za x2. Finally with the fourth case, we have neither x1b ≥ x2b
nor x1b ≤ x2b. Demand-inconsistency is then obtained with a combination of %za and
%zb identiﬁable preference relations. We have four such generic combinations: (x1 ≻za
x2 & x2b %zb x1b), (x1 %za x2 & x2b ≻zb x1b), (x2 ≻za x1 & x1b %zb x2b) and (x2 %za x1 &
x1b ≻zb x2b). Each such generic combination holds for an inﬁnite number of actual possible
{%za,%zb} combinations, and hence for an inﬁnite number of demand functions.
Theorem A1
Proof. Given the demand function b x deﬁne b YWC = (XWC × Z)
T b Y .
a. Let b x have single-preference on XWC. Also let (xa,z),(xb,z) ∈ b YWC with z ∈ Z. We need
to show that (xa,z) ∼wc (xb,z) ⇒ xa ∼z xb. However by deﬁnition of this seed relation,
(xa,z) ∼wc (xb,z) ⇒ xa = xb so that the ﬁrst condition of indiﬀerence relation b x-consistency
is trivially true. Now instead let (x1,za),(x2,zb),(x3,za), (x4,zb) ∈ (XWC × Z)
T b Y and
za,zb ∈ Z such that (x1,za) ∼wc (x2,zb) and (x3,za) ∼wc (x4,zb). Then again by deﬁnition
of the seed relation we have x1 = x2 and x3 = x4 so that trivially x1 %zb x3 ⇔ x2 %zb x4.
Since demand is single-preferenced on XWC, x1 %za x3 ⇔ x1 %zb x3. Putting these two
38together we have x1 %za x3 ⇔ x2 %zb x4, satisfying the second condition of indiﬀerence
relation b x-consistency. Thus ∼wc is b x-consistent on b YWC.
b. Let ∼wc be b x-consistent on b YWC, let x1,x2 ∈ XWC
T b X and let za,zb ∈ Z. Then
(x1,za) ∼wc (x1,zb) and (x2,za) ∼wc (x2,zb), so that by the second condition of b x-consistency
for indiﬀerence relations, x1 %za x2 ⇔ x1 %zb x2. Thus b x is single-preferenced on XWC.
Theorem A2
Proof. Given the demand function b x : ℜL
++ × Z × ℜ++ → ℜL with identiﬁable z-ﬁxed
preference relations {%z |z ∈ Z} and obtainable set b X, deﬁne b XWC = XWC
T b X. For some
element of Φ(b x), let %i be the restriction of that preference relation to b YWC = b XWC × Z.
a. Let b x be single-preferenced on XWC. We need to show that there exists a function
u : b XWC → ℜ and a preference relation %SX deﬁned on ℜ×Z such that %i can be speciﬁed
with equation (3) using this function and preference relation.
Let z0 ∈ Z, let u : b XWC → ℜ be a utility function that represents the restriction of
%z0 to b XWC, and let the set I be the partition of b XWC into the set of indiﬀerence sets
based on u. We then have
S
I∈I I = b XWC; Ia
T
Ib = ∅ for all Ia,Ib ∈ I with Ia  = Ib;
and u(xa) = u(xb) ⇔ Ia = Ib for any xa,xb ∈ b XWC and Ia,Ib ∈ I such that xa ∈ Ia
and xb ∈ Ib. For each I ∈ I let ¯ x(I) ∈ I be an arbitrarily chosen ﬁxed representative
element. Let U be set of all u(x) values for x ∈ b XWC. Then for each u0 ∈ U there is
some unique I0 ∈ I such that for any x0 ∈ I0 we have u0 = u(x0). We thus have a well
deﬁned inverse utility function Iu : U → I. We can now deﬁne our preference relation %SX
by (ua,za) ≻SX (ub,zb) ⇔ (¯ x(Iu(ua)),za) %i (¯ x(Iu(ub)),zb).
Let (xa,za),(xb,zb) ∈ b YWC. Then (u(xa),za) %SX (u(xb),zb) ⇔ (¯ x(Iu(u(xa))),za) %i
(¯ x(Iu(u(xb))),zb). By construction (¯ x(Iu(u(xa))),z0) ∼i (xa,z0) and (¯ x(Iu(u(xb))),z0) ∼i
(xb,z0). Since b x is single-preferenced on XWC, we also have (¯ x(Iu(u(xa))),za) ∼i (xa,za) and
(¯ x(Iu(u(xb))),zb) ∼i (xb,zb), so that (¯ x(Iu(u(xa))),za) %i (¯ x(Iu(u(xb))),zb) ⇔ (xa,za) %i
(xb,zb). Thus (u(xa),za) %SX (u(xb),zb) ⇔ (xa,za) %i (xb,zb).
b. Let b x be not single-preferenced on XWC. We need to show that there does not exist any
combination of a function u : b XWC → ℜ and a preference relation %SX deﬁned on ℜ × Z
such that %i can be speciﬁed with equation (3) using these two elements.
This is proved by contradiction. Suppose that these two elements exist. Let za,zb ∈ Z
and x1,x2 ∈ b XWC. Demand-consistency gives us (x1,za) %i (x2,za) ⇔ x1 %za x2 and
(x1,zb) %i (x2,zb) ⇔ x1 %zb x2. From equation (3) we have (x1,za) %i (x2,za) ⇔
(u(x1),za) %SX (u(x2),za) and (x1,zb) %i (x2,zb) ⇔ (u(x1),zb) %SX (u(x2),zb). We also
have (u(x1),za) %SX (u(x2),za) ⇔ u(x1) ≥ u(x2) ⇔ (u(x1),zb) %SX (u(x2),zb). Putting all
these together we get x1 %za x2 ⇔ x1 %zb x2, so that b x is single-preferenced on XWC. Then
by contradiction, the combination u and %SX cannot exist.
Theorem A3
Proof. Given the demand function b x with identiﬁable z-ﬁxed preference relations {%z |z ∈
39Z}, let a function χ : ℜ++×Z×Z → ℜ++ exist such that for any xαa
1 ,x
βa
1 ∈ ℜ++, xα
−1,x
β
−1 ∈
ℜ
L−1
++ and za,zb ∈ Z, equation (5) is valid with xαb
1 = χ(xαa
1 ,za,zb) and x
βb
1 = χ(x
βa
1 ,za,zb).
We need to prove the existence of some functions U : ℜ × ℜ
L−1
++ → ℜ and f : ℜ++ × Z → ℜ
such that %rp as deﬁned by equation (4) is b x-consistent.
For any ﬁxed z0 ∈ Z deﬁne f by f(x,z) = χ(x,z,z0). Let u0(x1,x−1) be a utility func-
tion that represents the identiﬁable preference relation %z0 and deﬁne U by U(f,x−1) =
u0(f,x−1). Finally we use these two functions in the context of equation (4) to fully deﬁne
a preference relation %rp. Then for any (xa∗
1 ,xa∗
−1),(xb∗
1 ,xb∗
−1) ∈ ℜL
++ and z∗ ∈ Z, we have,
(xa∗
1 ,xa∗
−1,z∗) %rp (xb∗
1 ,xb∗
−1,z∗) ⇔ U(f(xa∗
1 ,z∗),xa∗
−1) ≥ U(f(xb∗
1 ,z∗),xb∗
−1) ⇔ u0(χ(xa∗
1 ,z∗,z0),
xa∗
−1) ≥ u0(χ(xb∗
1 ,z∗,z0),xb∗
−1) ⇔ (χ(xa∗
1 ,z∗,z0),xa∗
−1) %z0 (χ(xb∗
1 ,z∗,z0),xb∗
−1) ⇔ (xa∗
1 ,xa∗
−1) %z∗
(xb∗
1 ,xb∗
−1), so that %rp is b x-consistent. The last equivalence relation comes from the properties
of χ in the context of equation (5).
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